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ARMS AND SECURITY
IN THE
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Introduction

The present paper brings together viewpoints expressed in 1996 on the changing attitudes to arms and security in our region following the end of the Cold War. We apologise for this late publication, in November, 1997, but feel these papers make valuable contributions to our understanding of security concerns, valuable still in 1997 and, indeed, in the future.

Professor Mack's talk was delivered in the 1996 Clinton Roper Peace Lecture series sponsored by the Aotearoa/New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, and provides a starting point for later talks organised by the University of Auckland Centre for Peace Studies in October, 1996. An earlier version of Associate-Professor Daizo Sakurada's talk was delivered at the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Dr Azizian's talk was delivered in October, 1996, at the University of Auckland, sponsored by the Centre for Peace Studies.

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Asia's Arms Build-up: A Cause for Concern?

Andrew Mack

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Cold War, defence budgets in most of the Third World and on both sides of what was the Iron Curtain are declining. By contrast, defence spending throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing — though less rapidly than GDP growth. As an arms-importing region, the Asia-Pacific still ranks below the Middle East, but far above the rest of the developing world. East Asia's share of global arms imports and related licensed production of major conventional weapons rose from 12.4% in 1984 to 21.1% in 1993¹. The Middle East is expected to be the world's largest arms recipient until at least 2000, accounting for about 30% of all international arms transfers. East Asia will remain the second biggest buyer, with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea being the three largest arms importers.

But while East Asia's *share* of global arms imports rose, the *absolute* level of arms acquisitions and licensed production fell between 1984 and 1993. According to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), which measures the value of armed *transfers* each year, not new *agreements*, the value of arms transferred and produced under licence in 1988 was US\$6.9 billion; in 1993 it was \$4.6 billion². The major cause of the decline has been the end of the Cold War and the consequent improvement in the regional security environment.

The on-going import-led military build-up in East Asia is transforming regional military capabilities in ways that could be destabilising should political relationships deteriorate seriously in the future.

States throughout the region are increasing their power projection capabilities with acquisition of new combat, surveillance and early-warning radar (AEW) aircraft, sophisticated missile systems, air-to-air refuelling capabilities, naval surface combatants and submarines.

The types of weapons systems being acquired reflect the fact that the security focus of most regional states is increasingly outward-looking — the domestic insurgencies that characterised much of the region in the 1960s, 1970s and, in some cases the 1980s, have either disappeared or are waning³.

Weapons acquisitions also reflect the facts of strategic geography. In the Asia-Pacific, unlike Europe, the Middle East or South Asia, the key states are either islands, or are located on peninsulas or archipelagos and security planning necessarily focuses on the maritime realm. In addition the introduction of 200 mile EEZs has given regional maritime forces new missions to pursue. These new missions determine the nature of many of the weapons platforms and surveillance systems which are being purchased. Only on the Korean peninsula is there a confrontation across a land frontier comparable with that across what used to be the Central Front in Europe⁴.

THE REGIONAL ARMS TRADE

Nearly three-quarters of all arms transfers to the Asia-Pacific flow to the heavily armed states of Northeast Asia. Most states in the region still rely heavily on imports to modernise their defence capabilities, although, as the industrial base of the more advanced regional states becomes more developed, the trend toward domestic production, mostly under some form of licensing agreement, may increase. China produces a full range of conventional weapons, albeit of out-moded design. Japan too produces most of its own weapons — although the more sophisticated systems are produced under licence. North and South Korea also produce a wide range of weapons systems, as does Taiwan. The only other countries which have significant levels of domestic arms production are Indonesia and Singapore.

Licensed production increased rapidly in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The number of major conventional weapons systems produced under licence in Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore and Australia, for example, went from one in 1967 to 24 in 1988⁵. The greater the share of a nation's weapons systems that is produced domestically, the less effective regulation of arms transfers will become as a means of controlling military arsenals.

But recent evidence suggests that indigenous weapons manufacture in so-called "third tier" producing countries — which include Singapore, Indonesia, North and South Korea and Taiwan — has "stabilised and even declined"⁶.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Although the absolute level of arms imports into the region has fallen, East Asia remains the second most important arms market in the world after the Middle East. Both supply — and demand-side pressures are likely to ensure that this continues to be the case. On the demand side these pressures include:

- * The particular security concerns of regional states.
- * The need to modernise outdated equipment. Much of the region's military equipment is obsolete or obsolescent. In 1992, for example, some 84% of the region's combat aircraft were based on pre-1966 designs, while South Korea's destroyers and most of Taiwan's major surface combatants are World War II vintage⁷. Sometimes state-of-the-art weapons systems may be sought for reasons of prestige rather than national security.
- * Especially in states where the armed forces play an important role in politics — Thailand, Burma and Indonesia are obvious examples — military prestige 'wish lists' can have a significant impact on defence procurements even when they have little relevance to genuine security needs.
- * The continuation of rapid rates of economic growth which tends to drag arms expenditures upwards. But absolute increases in defence expenditure do not necessarily mean that the *share* of defence expenditure in national income will increase. Indeed, in much of the region, defence expenditure has risen absolutely while falling as a percentage of GDP. Recent research indicates the single best indicator for increased defence expenditure is not, as the conventional strategic wisdom might

suggest, an increase in perceived external threats, but rather the rate of increase in the GDP⁸. But this is not necessarily so. If GDP rises, defence expenditures — and arms imports — will tend to rise *regardless* of perceived threats in the external environment. This helps explain such apparently anomalous situations as that in Thailand, where, despite the fact that the major perceived threats — from China and Soviet-backed Vietnam — had disappeared, defence expenditures continued to rise. The somewhat depressing implication of this finding is that national economic decline may be one of the most effective means to control rising defence budgets and hence arms imports.

- * Corruption. In many regional states, powerful individuals or groups within government and the military seek to purchase weapons systems primarily for the payoffs that can accompany such purchases. In Thailand, for example, a 1992 report claimed that “commissions” from arms sellers to senior Thai military officials averaged “... 15-20 percent of any deal”⁹. The clear implication here is that individual greed rather than strategic need was a major factor in determining arms purchases.

Supply-side factors include:

- * The desire of the major weapons-exporting states and corporations to replace markets lost as a consequence of the end of the Cold War.
- * The concern to prevent the decline or collapse of domestic defence industries for domestic political reasons. This was exemplified by the Bush Administration’s decision in the run-up to the 1992 election to permit a \$6 billion sale of F-16 fighters to Taiwan — a breach of a 1982 agreement between China and the US.
- * The concern of major powers, primarily the United States, to support allies and friends.
- * The willingness of particular weapons-supplying states and corporations to provide various corrupt inducements to buyers.

The end of the Cold War has clearly been the most important factor underpinning this decline and this is not *simply* because the resulting improvement in the East Asian security environment has reduced the demand for weapons. The economic crisis in Russia has forced changes in Moscow’s arms transfer policies which have also had a dramatic effect on the region. Vietnam and North Korea, once at the top of the regional arms-importing league, now import virtually nothing from Russia. The reason is not that the Russian government refuses in principle to sell to Leninist regimes, nor that Vietnam and North Korea have no desire to modernise their defence forces. It is rather that, since 1991, an increasingly impoverished Moscow has demanded that its former allies pay for all their imports, including arms, in hard currency, which they do not have.

Moscow’s hard-nosed policy plunged the North Korean economy deep into crisis; Vietnam’s economy was less affected. Both countries lacked the hard currency reserves necessary to pay for weapons; neither could have borrowed from abroad for this purpose even if they had wanted to.

To compensate for the loss of traditional markets, in the early 1990s, Moscow began to push hard for sales to non-traditional customers in the region. But its only notable success to date has been the sale of 18 MiG-29 Fulcrums to Malaysia. Other countries have expressed interest but no more. One reason for Russia’s relative lack of success is that the

stunning successes of Western over Soviet arms in the Gulf War have made Russian weapons considerably less desirable than those of the West.

Russia's most important market in the Asia-Pacific region, indeed the world, is China and the relative importance of the Chinese market has grown considerably since Vietnam and North Korea effectively ceased to be Russian customers. The Chinese have bought over 440 T-72M tanks and 26 Su-27 fighters, the first relatively modern combat aircraft in China's inventory. (The Su-27 is a 1970s design — most of China's combat aircraft are 1950s and 1960s design vintage.) Reports of further orders of Su-27s and Su-24s and MiG-29s and 31s have appeared from time to time in the press, but thus far no deliveries have been made, nor have any licensed production facilities been established.

The Russians reportedly even offered to sell their supersonic, long-range Tu-22 Backfire bomber to China¹⁰ and the 3000-km range AS-15 missile¹¹. Any such deals would generate great concern in the region. Other Russian items on China's military wish-list include rocket engines, improved radars and missile guidance systems and, possibly, an aircraft carrier.

The combination of a booming economy, the perceived need for military modernisation and a desire not to be too dependent on Western suppliers, means that China is likely to continue to be Moscow's most important arms market for the foreseeable future.

While the US is increasingly being challenged by its European arms-producing rivals in East Asian markets, the United States retains a number of advantages over its competitors, particularly in the case of combat aircraft. The ubiquitous US F-16, for example, is still the single most popular fighter/strike aircraft in the region. The continuing popularity of these aircraft arises in part because so many were purchased during the Cold War and regional air forces have become familiar with their operation, and in part because of their cost and performance advantages. Air and ground crew familiarity, commonality of spares parts, availability of upgrades and interoperability with US and other regional forces are also factors. Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea either have, or are in the process of acquiring, F-16s. Japan, Australia and Malaysia have ignored the regional preference for F-16s, acquiring F-15s, FA-18s, and MiG-29s and FA-18s respectively. Taiwan is acquiring 60 Mirage 2000s as well as 150 F-16s and both Taiwan and Japan have indigenous fighter programs — the IDF and the FSX respectively.

China's arms sales to the Third World have declined dramatically, from \$5.9 billion in 1987 to \$500 million in 1994¹². The decline was due primarily to the collapse of China's markets in the Middle East. China's major East Asian customers have been Myanmar and Thailand. Low price was a major selling point for Chinese weapons, although corruption is also alleged to have been a factor in sales to both countries¹³. Further large orders from Thailand seem unlikely since the Thai military is unhappy with the quality of the arms, including tanks and naval surface combatants, it has obtained from China. Myanmar, reportedly spent \$1.2 billion in 1990 on a range of Chinese weapons systems, including tanks and some 24 F6 and/or F7 fighters (Chinese versions of the Russian MiG-19 and MiG-21)¹⁴.

A BUYER'S MARKET

The end of the Cold War and the resulting reduction in demand for weapons in Europe and the United States mean that worldwide there is now a buyers' market for weapons systems. In Asia, unlike other regions, demand remains buoyant.

The procurement decisions of regional states are now determined more by considerations of cost and a desire to acquire particular weapons technologies, than by ideology or alliance (Japan may be an exception to this rule). One consequence of this trend is that for a number of regional states in Asia-Pacific, the United States is no longer automatically the supplier of choice. The highly competitive nature of the current arms market also means that regional states can, and do, demand sophisticated state-of-the-art weapons systems that supplier states would once have been reluctant to sell. There are, of course, limits to what can be supplied. The United States is not about to permit the transfer of Stealth fighters to the region. However, regional states recognise that the nature of the global arms market gives them new bargaining leverage and that advanced weapons systems that one country refuses to sell another probably will.

Taiwan is a case in point. To avoid offending China, the United States had long denied Taipei the F-16s it sought, so the Taiwanese turned to the French firm Dassault and negotiated to buy 60 Mirage 2000s, much to China's fury¹⁵. Taipei had considered buying MiG-29s, Israeli Kfir C-7s and the Italian AMX, as well as the Mirage, and is currently building 140 of its largely indigenous IDF fighters. Taiwan's huge foreign reserves and its determination to build up its defence forces, make it an extraordinarily attractive market for arms corporations. Sales are constrained, however, by concern in the arms exporting states not to offend China.

In mid-1992, the Bush administration, confronted with the very real possibility of defeat in the election and anxious to avoid further factory closures in the pre-election period, decided to endure the predictable Chinese outrage and sell Taiwan the F-16s after all. The package deal for 150 aircraft was worth nearly \$6 billion.

US concern not to offend China has been a real restraint on American arms sales to Taiwan, but the Taiwanese can often find other suppliers. The Mirage deal is not the only example. When Taipei was denied access to US Harpoon anti-ship missiles (ASMs) it negotiated a licensing deal with Israel to produce the Gabriel ASM.

The US also denied its arms corporations sales opportunities in Indonesia when it refused to sell arms to Indonesia until the Suharto government improved its human rights record. The French and British had no such scruples and competed vigorously for Indonesia arms contracts. While politics — as with the cases of Taiwan and Indonesia — may have caused the United States to lose some arms sales, it is by no means the only reason. According to James Blackwell, "... many U.S. defence officials and military officers have not adjusted to the notion that they must now compete on an even basis with European companies which often enjoy government backing"¹⁶. Sellers are more aggressive than ever — as France's elevation to first place in the world arms sales league in 1994 indicates.

With possibly as many as 3000 new fighters and strike aircraft reportedly being procured by Asia-Pacific states during the next decade, and an equal number of existing aircraft being

upgraded, market opportunities for extra-regional producers are considerable¹⁷. Regional states have been actively shopping around in their search for the right weapons systems at the right price. Seeking to acquire modern fighters, both the Philippines and Taiwan looked at the Israeli Kfir fighter which is a third the price of the F-16. The Thai military sought (ultimately unsuccessfully) to buy AMX fighters from Italy in the early 1990s¹⁸. Taiwan also expressed interest in the AMX. During the same period, a number of states, including Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea, expressed interest in the European multi-role Tornado, while Taiwan, China and South Korea, as well as Malaysia, considered the MiG-29.

The high cost of the most sophisticated modern fighters — the F-15, F/A-18, Tornado, Mirage 2000, even the F-16 — restricts the ability of Asia-Pacific states, particularly in Southeast Asia, to buy them in large numbers. Indeed, high prices is one reason that military aircraft imports into the region have been trending down since the mid-1980s. Relatively cheap light fighter/trainers can, however, complement the more sophisticated combat platforms, and using the extra numbers to provide more comprehensive area coverage, makes good strategic sense. The Europeans have more to offer here than the United States. British Aerospace has had great success in selling its light multi-role (including light strike) Hawk throughout the region. Malaysia, Brunei, South Korea and Indonesia have bought or ordered Hawks, and other countries are considering them.

European arms manufacturers have also been highly successful in selling naval platforms to the region, although often with a high degree of offsetting being demanded by the purchasing country. Demand continues to be strong, 'some 200 new major surface combatants are programmed for procurement [in the 1990s], and about 50 more are under serious consideration'¹⁹. Taiwan ordered six Lafayette frigates from France in 1992 to complement the eight US Perry Class frigates it is building under licence. Indonesia, has bought 39 former East German Navy ships²⁰. Brunei is getting three missile attack boats from the United Kingdom; the Philippines is acquiring three similar boats from Spain and three more from Australia; Malaysia is buying two sophisticated frigates from the United Kingdom and has signalled its intention to buy 18 offshore patrol vessels²¹. Myanmar has bought three coastal patrol boats from Yugoslavia in addition to the six it acquired from China²². Australia is building eight 'ANZAC Class' German Meko light frigates for its Navy, with a further two being produced for New Zealand, and Singapore is buying a landing ship and four mine countermeasures ships from Sweden.

The fact that the United States does not produce conventional submarines means this important market is the exclusive preserve of Europe and Russia. Some 36 submarines are likely to be acquired by East Asian states in the 1990s²³. Australia is building under licence six highly capable Swedish-design Collins Class submarines, for which air-independent operation is a future option. Japan is acquiring 15 new submarines (to be built in-country); Taiwan is seeking six to ten new boats. The French reportedly offered Rubis class nuclear attack submarines to Taipei²⁴. South Korea may be seeking to acquire as many as 16 German Type 209/3s²⁵. In Southeast Asia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are all contemplating buying submarines, although the numbers purchased will likely be small. Indonesia, with two old German-built submarines, is the only Southeast Asian state with submarines, though Australia has six Oberon Class boats which will be replaced in the 1990s with the even more capable Collins class. Russia is doing less well than Europe in the submarine sales league. Currently only China, which is buying Kilo class submarines,

is a Russian customer. North Korea has 22 obsolete Soviet submarines, but will not be able to acquire any more. Pyongyang not only lacks the finance to buy major weapons systems, but Moscow has undertaken not to sell the North any new arms.

While no regional navies currently deploy aircraft carriers, there have, since 1992, been persistent reports that China is seeking to buy a carrier from Russia. These reports have caused some concern in the region since such an acquisition would considerably increase China's ability to project air power over the contested waters of the South China Sea. In October 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announced that China had abandoned plans to buy the carrier²⁶. However, this and other denials have met with scepticism among regional security analysts who believe that it is temporary financial constraint, not a change in heart, which has prevented a sale thus far²⁷. Security planners in Japan are known to be interested in acquiring a small aircraft carrier, while Thailand has ordered a light carrier from Spain. Even small carriers are capable of operating very short take-off and landing (VSTOL) combat aircraft such as the Harrier.

Within the region, the desire for increased self-reliance in defence, national pride and a need to generate domestic employment combine to impel some states toward indigenous weapons production — even where this may not be cost-effective from a purely economic point of view. Japan's FS-X fighter program and Taiwan's IDF program are obvious examples. Insofar as the trend continues — and it is very evident in the shipbuilding area — traditional suppliers from the United States and Europe will sell relatively fewer off-the-shelf weapons systems, and relatively more of the high-tech components for those systems that regional states are unable to produce themselves.

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUILD-UP

It is sometimes claimed that the flow of modern weapons systems to the Asia-Pacific region is of no great consequence because regional states are not seeking to acquire major power projection capabilities. It is true that no states in the region appear to be seeking the sorts of forces necessary to mount successful invasions against neighbours, although the North Koreans have long had massive offensive forces configured to "seize and hold territory" and China's build-up and provocative posturing in and around the Taiwan Strait have caused great concern in Taipei and elsewhere in the region. But "power projection" is an idea which embraces more than the capability to invade other states. It also includes the capability to strike distant military targets — at sea as well as on land. In this latter sense power projection capabilities *are* growing in the region.

While no country in Northeast or Southeast Asia has long-range strike aircraft comparable to Australia's F-111s, the modern combat aircraft they have acquired, or are acquiring, are formidable power projection platforms. The strike range and capability of these aircraft is being further enhanced by the acquisition of air-to-air refuelling capabilities and some form of AEW, both of which are potent force multipliers. Long-range maritime patrol aircraft such as the Orion P-3 — can also deliver air-to-surface missiles over long distances.

Acquisition of over-the-horizon anti-shiping missiles (ASMs) — mostly Harpoon and Exocet — by almost all navies in the region represents a further transformation in regional naval strike capabilities. A small Fast Attack Craft, aircraft, or submarine armed with

Harpoon missiles can, for example, strike over a greater range and with far more accuracy than a salvo from a World War II battleship. Fired from over-the-horizon, a Harpoon can blow a frigate in half²⁸. Quiet, modern submarines armed with ASMs are a particularly lethal combination.

Some regional states are acquiring — and in the case of China and North Korea exporting — a range of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles²⁹. China, Taiwan, and North and South Korea all have largely indigenous missile programs based on knowledge gained by reverse-engineering missiles imported from the United States, Israel or the USSR many years ago. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan also have space-launch programs of varying degrees of sophistication that could rapidly be converted into missile programs; Indonesia has an embryonic space-launch program. Apart from China, no countries in the region have long-range cruise missile programs, although the current Liberal-National coalition government in Australia has expressed interest in acquiring conventionally-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles as an eventual replacement for the aging F-111s. Any such move could be potentially destabilising — leading to other countries seeking similar offensive capabilities.

The ballistic missiles currently deployed in the Asia-Pacific region do not have much power projection capability when armed with conventional warheads. Against countries with limited air defence capabilities they are far less cost-effective than strike aircraft³⁰. The real concern is that they may be matched with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. The Pentagon has claimed that Myanmar, China, Taiwan, Vietnam and North Korea have offensive chemical weapons capabilities³¹. North Korea and Taiwan are suspected of having biological warfare capabilities³².

The gravest threat, of course, would be missiles armed with nuclear warheads. There is *some* risk that this threat could be realised in the medium- and long-term. The October 1994 US/DPRK Agreed Framework is supposed to have put a halt to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, but the North may have acquired smuggled fissile material from Russia (there were unconfirmed reports to this effect in 1992), or have created a clandestine underground nuclear program. Either option could have provided the North with enough plutonium for a number of nuclear weapons. It is also possible that the North may have diverted enough plutonium from the research reactor whose operations it has declared to build one or possibly two nuclear weapons. South Korea and Taiwan have both sought over some twenty years to acquire nuclear weapons technologies — though without success. Japan's commitment to plutonium production is generating considerable regional concern, and not just in North Korea. Japan has enough weapons-useable plutonium for hundreds of nuclear weapons.

The risk that regional states will seek to go nuclear will be considerably increased if the US security commitment to the region is withdrawn. Many regional states are concerned that this is a real possibility.

It is true that there are supply-side regimes which seek to control the transfer of nuclear and missile technology. But in East Asia the *likely* proliferator states already have the technical capability to make nuclear weapons and build missiles, while US leverage over the *possible* proliferator states (Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) has been declining since the end of the Cold War as the nuclear industries of regional states become increasingly self-

reliant, and as sources of supply of nuclear materials and technologies are diversified. This suggests that supply-side regimes are likely to be decreasingly effective in future.

WOULD SUPPLY-SIDE RESTRAINTS ON ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE REGION BE EFFECTIVE?

In the aftermath of the Gulf War there was an upsurge of demand for negotiated restraints on the global arms trade. In the United States, for example, a March 1991 poll found that 82% of Americans wanted a multilateral agreement to limit arms transfers to the Middle East³³. In October 1991, in response to these concerns, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China — the Permanent Five (P-5) members of the UN Security Council — launched an initiative to prevent “destabilising arms transfers”. While the P-5 initiative was intended primarily to restrain the arms build-up in the Middle East it was also hoped that it could serve as a model for restraining arms transfers to other regions of the world.

The P-5 initiative did not, however, call for *reductions* in arms transfers. Arms exports for the “legitimate right to self-defence,” as enshrined in the U.N. Charter, were not proscribed in any way. Herein lay the first problem. What constitutes “legitimate self-defence” is frequently contested. Nation states invariably claim that their weapons purchases are for “legitimate self-defence” and only very rarely is aggression as blatant as Saddam Hussein’s. Indeed, the language of the initiative statement was so ambiguous and potentially contradictory it seemed almost designed to fail. Almost every clause offered loopholes. For example:

- * Arms transfers that “prolong and aggravate an existing armed conflict” were proscribed, despite the fact that the import of arms for “legitimate self-defence”, which was permissible under the guidelines, might well “prolong an existing conflict”.
- * Arms transfers intended solely to meet the “needs of legitimate self-defence” were to be permitted, but arms transfers that “increase tension in a region” were proscribed. Yet the former could clearly lead to the latter.
- * Arms transfers that could “introduce destabilising military capabilities to a region” were proscribed, yet a weapons system that one state believed was “destabilising” another might see as enhancing “legitimate self-defence” and thus permissible.
- * Arms transfers that seriously undermined the recipient state’s economy were proscribed, even though arms transfers for “legitimate self-defence” could have precisely this consequence.

Even if these hopelessly contradictory guidelines could have been applied it is unlikely they would have precluded *any* of the arms transfers to the Asia-Pacific region over the past decade. Indeed, according to William Hartung, “State Department officials involved in the Big Five discussions have already indicated that they cannot conceive of any [military] sale the United States would be prevented from making under the guidelines”³⁴. But today the question is purely academic. Following the US sale of F-16s to Taiwan, Beijing announced it would no longer be bound by the ambiguous guidelines. Whatever hopes the international community may have entertained about negotiated multilateral restraints on arms transfers were dashed.

Nor were there any grounds for optimism with respect to unilateral restraint. In February 1995, the Clinton Administration announced a new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. The new policy views conventional arms transfers as a legitimate instrument of US foreign policy when they "... enable the United States to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional security and increase interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces"³⁵. This is essentially a policy for *encouraging* arms sales not restraining them.

In the mid-1990s Washington is only interested in curtailing arms transfers to states that have incurred deep US political disapproval. As Richard Grimmett of the Congressional Research Service writes:

Although the Administration has emphasised that its decisions on arms transfers will not be driven by commercial considerations, but primarily by national security, the Clinton arms transfer policy holds that supporting a strong, sustainable American defence-industrial base is a key national security concern, rather than a purely commercial matter. In so doing, the Clinton policy publicly elevates the significance of domestic economic considerations in the arms transfer decision-making process to a higher degree than has been the case in previous administrations³⁶.

There is *some* support in Congress as well as in the arms control community for greater restraint on arms transfers. On February 1, 1995 Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark Hatfield and House International Relations Committee member Cynthia McKinney introduced the "Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1995". The bill attracted 109 House and Senate co-sponsors, but not enough support to pass. It was also fiercely denounced by regional states such as Malaysia. US officials indicated that the Administration did not support this legislation.

The Code of Conduct would prohibit arms exports to any government that does not meet the criteria set out in the law, unless the President exempts a country and Congress passes a law affirming that exemption. The conditions a country must meet in order to be eligible for US weapons stipulated by the Code are:

- * democratic form of government
- * respect for basic human rights of citizens
- * non-aggression (against other states)
- * full participation in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.

Yet as a recent Federation of American Scientists' report notes:

... the Code's criteria are all primary foreign policy tenets of past and present U.S. administrations. Nevertheless, 90 percent of the record \$14.8 billion in U.S. arms sales to the Third World in 1993 went to states which do not meet the Code's criteria³⁷.

Without US leadership, or at the very least support, there is no chance of any global restraint regime being successfully negotiated. Currently, Washington does not appear be interested in either leading or supporting moves to create such a regime. Nor, it must be said, is there any interest among any East Asia states.

Geoffrey Kemp speaks for many security planners when he argues that preventing war, "... may mean providing additional weapons to friendly countries rather than seeking to restrict their inventories"³⁸. This is clearly a common view in Washington and is based on the assumption that tilting the military balance in favour of friends and allies enhances

deterrence and thus reduces the risk of aggression. The risks which may be associated with this approach are discussed later.

A WALK ON THE DEMAND SIDE

“Far-reaching arms control agreements among ... countries will depend on progress to resolve regional conflicts”³⁹. Geoffrey Kemp made this observation about the situation in the Middle East, but it applies with equal force to Asia-Pacific. Demand-side approaches to controlling global arms transfers focus, as the term suggests, not on controlling the supply of weapons and weapons technologies to particular regions, but rather on the security (and other) concerns that give rise to demands for the arms in the first place. If conflicts can be resolved, the demand for arms will be reduced and arms flows will slow without any supply-side regimes being instituted. Arms control regimes, as is often noted, are most difficult to negotiate when most needed; least difficult when least needed.

The assumption that states may acquire more security by acquiring more arms — “if you want peace prepare for war” — has a venerable military history. It is also the precept that legitimised arms transfers under the P-5 guidelines. As the United Kingdom’s Lord Caithness put it at the October 1991 P-5 meeting, “... the right of self-defence ... is meaningless if states cannot also acquire the means to defend themselves”⁴⁰. However, while “peace through strength” policies may be an appropriate means of enhancing security in some contexts, they may be quite inappropriate in others.

Where the central security problem a state confronts is the threat of unprovoked aggression, deterrence is an appropriate response, and arms transfers will enhance the security of the threatened state by increasing its deterrent and war-fighting capabilities. Where the threats are less tangible or imaginary — when adversarial states may have mutual suspicions, but no aggressive intentions — arms transfers may exacerbate the “security dilemma” by increasing fear, suspicion and hostility.

“Security dilemmas” arise when the defensive preparations of one state are taken by another as evidence of an offensive intent. Action-reaction “conflict spirals” may result, leading to crises which cannot be controlled and to violent military confrontations that none of the parties originally sought. In other words, the arms transfers intended to enhance deterrence and reduce the risk of aggression may, perversely, increase the possibility of unintended war.

Avoidance of the risks inherent in “conflict spirals” and “security dilemmas” requires greater stress on demand-side strategies of reassurance and less stress on offensive deterrence. Seeking an appropriate balance between deterrence and reassurance is not, however, easy. Too much emphasis on deterrence can exacerbate security dilemmas and may trigger self-defeating arms spirals. Too much reassurance, on the other hand, may appear as appeasement and undermine deterrence.

In areas of tension in the Asia-Pacific region, the deterrence/reassurance balance often appears tilted too far in the direction of deterrence — only Japan pursues a self-conscious policy of seeking to reassure its neighbours, not least by eschewing acquisition of offensive weapons. Confronting strategic uncertainty, the normal response of regional security

planners has been to increase defence preparedness, which usually means increasing arms imports.

Precisely because the strategic future is so uncertain in East Asia, and because many states view each other with muted suspicion, the case for a greater emphasis on reassurance strategies is compelling. Such strategies may include engagement in bilateral and multilateral security dialogues, military transparency, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and a shift toward defence-dominant force structures and strategies. The “instability” risks associated with arms races do not exist when the force structures being strengthened are purely defensive⁴¹. One reason that Japan has been able to rise to third place in the global defence spending league without causing undue regional concern is that its force structure is defensive. Japan deploys no long-range bombers, missiles, aircraft carriers etc; it simply lacks the physical capability to invade and subjugate its neighbours — a fact which has enormously reassured Japan’s neighbours about its intentions.

Regional interest in reassurance strategies has been growing steadily in the 1990s. The value of pursuing “security dialogues” and CSBM regimes is no longer contentious in the mainstream security discourse in the region, a radical change from the 1980s. A region-wide security dialogue process has been institutionalised in the annual high-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings. The ARF has met annually since 1994. Working groups of officials have been established which pursue issues which the ARF member states designate as important and bring recommendations back to the annual meeting. Issues which are too sensitive to handle at the official level can be discussed in so-called ‘Track II’ forums whose members include academics, ‘think tank’ experts and officials who participate under the polite fiction that they are there in their “private capacity”. Reports and recommendations from ‘Track II’ meetings may inform the deliberations of ARF meeting.

But East Asian approaches to confidence-building are very different to that of most Western states. Coming from lawyer cultures, Westerners tend to see dialogue as leading to negotiation on substantive security issues, with the point of negotiation being to reach verifiable legal agreements. The ASEAN approach sees dialogue primarily as a means of building relationships. With good relationships both the risk of conflict and the need for formal agreements are reduced. ASEAN’s Western ‘dialogue’ partners have frequently found the modus operandi of the ARF somewhat frustrating since little of substance gets agreed.

Within the ARF there has been no discussion of limiting arms transfers into the region. On the contrary, defence modernisation, which depends on arms imports, is widely supported. Even the most modest steps towards increasing “transparency” in arms transfers are often resisted. There has been some discussion of creating a Regional Arms Transfer Register, an idea which originated from Malaysia, but it has little support within the region. But even if there were greater transparency in arms transfers it is not clear that this would help promote moves to control them.

Demand-side strategies ultimately have to go beyond the pursuit of modest “transparency” measures and other low-level CSBMs and seek to manage and ultimately resolve regional conflicts. Arms restraint, as Ernest Graves has noted, “depends very much on the outcome of efforts to resolve longstanding political conflicts”⁴². There is growing recognition in the

region that such approaches are necessary and both preventive diplomacy and conflict management and resolution are now on the ARF agenda.

But even successful conflict resolution strategies would not address all of the factors which determine the demand for arms acquisitions. They would, for example, be irrelevant if the demand for arms imports arose from corrupt inducements offered by sellers or commissions sought by buyers.

Conflict resolution is irrelevant where arms are imported because states perceive them to be necessary for the legitimate replacement of outdated equipment. Defence modernisation is frequently pursued in the absence of external threats.

Conflict resolution is also irrelevant if, as seems to be the case, it is economic growth rates and not external threats that are the major determinant of military expenditure and arms imports.

Finally, conflict resolution has little direct relevance to perhaps the most important *strategic* factor underpinning the military build-up in Asia-Pacific — the fear that the United States may withdraw from the region. Many regional security planners are concerned, notwithstanding constant reassurances from US officials, that growing isolationist sentiments at home will, sooner or later, impel the United States to withdraw from the region. The original rationale for the US presence in Asia — the containment of Soviet communism — vanished with the break-up of the USSR.

In the mid-1990s East Asian states are militarily more self-reliant, nationalism and even anti-Americanism are increasingly evident among America's allies, while trading conflicts are a source of constant tension. Regional states doubt the political and economic ability of the US to sustain its commitment in the long term. And even if the US stays formally engaged there are fears that the 'Somalia Syndrome' would force a withdrawal if the US were drawn into a regional conflict and US forces sustained large numbers of casualties. Whether these regional perceptions are correct or not is of relatively little consequence: they exist, and they have a real impact on regional defence policies.

Insofar as fear of a US withdrawal is a factor driving arms acquisitions in the region, it is difficult to see what can be done to reassure the states in the region and thus reduce the demand for weapons transfers. Verbal assurances are inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

The probability that arms transfers to the region will be controlled by supply-side means is not great. The most intractable problem is that neither buyers nor sellers see any need to curb arms transfers to the region — quite the contrary. Since the motivations for arms acquisition are many and various no one strategy will lead to restraint. The demand-side approaches which are receiving increasing attention in the region may help create a security environment where the demand for weapons begins to fall. Ultimately, however, changes in the region's economic relationships may provide the greatest disincentive for war and thus decrease the demand for arms procurements.

Market-driven trade and foreign direct investment strategies are increasing regional economic integration and as regional economies become more and more 'enmeshed' with each other the costs of war rise and the benefits decrease. When access to land and raw materials were the keys to national wealth, war was economically rational. Today this is no longer the case. States get rich through expanding trade and increasing domestic productivity.

Market-driven economic growth also strengthens civil society vis a vis the state and encourages the emergence of pluralist political institutions — Taiwan and South Korea are obvious regional examples. One of the best established findings of international relations research is that democracies do not fight each other, thus the continued spread of democracy in East Asia may well be a force for regional peace.

Interstate war is, in fact, extremely rare in the modern world. In 1993, there were 34 'major armed conflicts' (a 'major armed conflict' is one in which there have been at least 1000 battle-related deaths), yet not one of these was an interstate war.

Statesmen have yet to adjust to the idea that interstate war, at least between the relatively developed states, is becoming increasingly rare. Security planners will naturally be sceptical. Yet if the extraordinary decline in interstate war is not accidental, *if*, as I suggested above, it is caused by profound changes in the structure of the global economy and polity, and if these disincentives for war are reinforced by the increasingly strong global norm against the resort to war in international disputes, then the prospects for reducing arms levels may be quite good.

What the above suggests is that the encouragement of foreign trade, foreign direct investment and the growth of democratic institutions in East Asia may be a better strategy for reducing arms acquisitions than either the traditional supply-side strategies of the arms control community or even the most ambitious confidence-building proposals on the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

ENDNOTES

1. Bates Gill, "Arms Acquisitions in East Asia", *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p.552.
2. *Ibid.*, p.552.
3. Only in the Philippines has the military been *primarily* concerned with counter-insurgency. Indonesia confronts minor insurgencies (in East Timor and Irian Jaya), as does the military in Burma.
4. The Sino-Soviet, Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Indian borders have all been sites of military confrontation in the past. But China has moved to resolve border tensions with most of its neighbours and European-style confidence-building measures have been implemented on the Sino-Indian and Sino-Russia borders.
5. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), *Global Arms Trade*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1991, p.166.
6. Gill, "Arms Acquisitions in East Asia", p.555.
7. *Ibid.* p.556.
8. Daniel P. Hewitt, "What Determines Military Expenditures", *Finance and Development* (December 1991):22.

9. Tai Ming Cheung, "Officers' Commission: Arms Procurement Driven by Profit Rather Than Need", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 2, 1992, p.13. See also Kenneth Stier and Bao Anyou, "Khaki Commerce", *Asia, Inc.* (October 1992).
10. Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1984-1991*, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p.20.
11. See Antony Spellman, "US, French Fighter Sales to Taiwan Nudge Mainland China Closer to Russia", *Armed Forces Journal* (January 1993):16
12. Grimmett p.29.
13. Op. cit., Stier and Anyou, "Khaki Commerce"
14. John Badgley, "A Clear Gathering of Miraculous Success", *Peace and Security* (Spring 1992):11.
15. On November 18, 1992, the Taiwanese Air Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Dassault Aviation covering the sale of 60 Mirage 2000-5 multi-role fighters. The \$2.6 billion deal includes an option for an additional 40 fighters. Op. cit., Spellman, "US, French Fighter Sales ...", p.16.
16. James A. Blackwell, "Defence Industrial Cooperation in Asia: U.S. View", a paper presented at the 5th KIDA/CSIS International Defence Conference, Seoul, October 13-14, 1992, p.23.
17. Panitan Wattanaygorn and Desmond Ball, "A Regional Arms Race", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (September 1995):149.
18. "Thailand", *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* (February-March 1992):33.
19. Wattanaygorn and Ball, "A Regional Arms Race", p.151.
20. The 39 ships include 16 corvettes and 9 minesweepers. See "German Ships for Indonesia", *Miltech* (September 1992):111.
21. Op. cit., Donville, "A Foot in the Door"
22. "New Base Is Boost to Naval Power", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, September 12, 1992, p.32.
23. Wattanaygorn and Ball, "A Regional Arms Race", p. 152.
24. Op. cit., Spellman, "US, French Fighter Sales to Taiwan ...", p.16.
25. Wattanaygorn and Ball, "A Regional Arms Race", p.152.
26. "China Reportedly Won't Buy Carrier", *Japan Times*, October 9, 1992.
27. Notwithstanding the foreign minister's denial, China's President, Yang Shangkun, said in November 1992 that the government had decided to buy a carrier. See "Chinese Leader Urges Purchase of Carrier", *The Washington Times*, November 30, 1992.
28. However, few countries in the region have the target-acquisition platforms necessary for effective over-the-horizon targeting of ASMs such as Harpoon and Exocet.
29. There have been no further exports of the 2500 km range CSS2 missiles China sold to Saudi Arabia.
30. A point the Chinese constantly — and with some logic — make when responding to U.S. criticism of China's missile exports. U.S. officials have never satisfactorily explained why exporting relatively short-range and inaccurate missiles with modest payloads is destabilising, while the export of Western strike aircraft that can attack distant targets with great accuracy and much greater payloads than the missiles is not.
31. Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, in testimony before the Seapower, Strategic and Critical Raw Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, March 9, 1991, pp. 57-58.
32. Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, in testimony before the Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, March 14, 1990, p.54.
33. Cited in William D. Hartung, "Curbing the Arms Race", *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1992):22.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
35. Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Countries 1987-94*, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., August 4, 1995, p.18.
36. *Ibid.*, p.18.
37. Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/atwg/conduct/s326.html>.
38. Geoffrey Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991, p.10. Kemp was writing about the Middle East but the philosophy which underpinned his argument has much broader relevance.
39. *Ibid.*, p.151.
40. Statement by Lord Caithness, U.K. Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, London, October 17, 1991.
41. The idea of a 'defensive' weapons system makes little sense since defensive weapons can be force multipliers for *offensive* systems in an offence-dominant force structure. Defence-dominant force structures are those that have powerful defensive forces but very weak forces for offensive operations.

By offensive capabilities is meant not only those that can 'seize and hold territory', but also those that can project airpower against an opponent's homeland--or naval assets. For an evaluation of the pros and cons of defensive strategies and force structures in a regional context see Andrew Mack, "The Strategy of Non-Provocative Defence", *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis* (Summer 1991).

42. Ernest Graves, "The Future of U.S. Security Assistance and Arms Sales", *Washington Quarterly* 14 (5)(Summer 1991):91.
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THE POST-COLD WAR ERA AND JAPAN: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN'S STRATEGY⁺

Daizo Sakurada^{*}

1. Introduction: Japan in the Transition Period

Japan is in a flux. Once considered as the most stable polity, heading in predictable external directions, Japan is now searching for a role in the world. Passive 'reactive' external policy style, familiar from Tokyo's interactions with the international community since the end of World War II, is now largely gone. In its place in this post-Cold War era of uncertainty is a renovated Japan with a new consensus in its security direction. Two major factors have cast doubts on steadiness of Japan's direction: the impact of the end of the Cold War on Japan, and change in the Japanese political situation due to revision of electoral rules.

This paper discusses the major trends of Japanese foreign and defence policy from the end of World War II to the present. Then, it examines Japan's future position in the world based on certain semi-constant factors. For instance, demographic trends represented by the aging of the population in the near future will become a profound influence on Japan's external activities. This paper will explain these semi-constant and other more fluid factors affecting Japanese society. Lastly, some policy implications will be presented reflecting the arguments in this paper. The paper argues that Japan should stay actively engaged in the world despite some economic and social problems ahead. Some adjustments may be necessary for the betterment of international society. Some policy prescriptions learned from Canada's external policies will follow in conclusion.

2. Japanese Foreign Relations and Defence Policy

The two factors transforming Japan's situation in world affairs have been the demise of the Cold War, and the end of domestic political stability caused by the change in electoral rules introducing a combination of proportional representation and a single-member constituency system. These factors have propelled Tokyo to depart from its easy but largely 'reactive' type of dealing with international issues¹. In retrospect,

⁺ An earlier shorter version of this essay was submitted for publication in *Social Sciences Research (University of Tokushima)*. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance and/or editing of the staff of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, and Centre for Peace Studies, University of Auckland. Also appreciated is the financial contribution in the form of an Asia 2000 Foundation Fellowship. The author is, however, solely responsible for any errors or analysis. This paper was written before the 20 October 1996 election in Japan.

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¹ For the analysis of Japan's 'reactiveness' due to the peculiar domestic constraints, see Kent Calder, 'Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State', *World Politics* 44.4

the Cold War provided Japan with a peculiar stability in its foreign relations. Indeed, continuity was the great characteristic of Japan's associations with outsiders during the Cold War era. An examination of the foundations of Japan's foreign relations reveals the pattern by which Japan became a 'reactive state' in dealing with international issues in the Cold War era.

After the defeat by the Allied Powers in 1945, Japan was occupied by the United States-led Allied Forces. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), effectively ruled Japan. He introduced triple-D policies into post-war Japanese society, i.e. demilitarisation, democratisation and decentralisation². Democratisation was the most successful while decentralisation was a total failure, witnessed by the overcentralisation of all major functions in Tokyo. What was achieved under the SCAP rule was a new Japan of a more democratic and peace-minded nature. MacArthur's informal rule ended with Japan signing the peace treaty with forty-eight states in San Francisco in 1951, thereby regaining its full sovereignty. On the same day, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (hereafter referred to as the US-Japan Security Treaty) established the core foundation of Japan's external relations.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty have become the cornerstones for Japan's external relations. As a result, there emerged over the years three tenets of Japanese external strategy largely directed at securing domestic economic growth, which have been aptly summarised by Daniel Okimoto as follows³:

1. Extending and maintaining economic, political and military ties with the United States and making this alliance the central axis of foreign policy,
2. Separating economic issues from political and military entanglements and pursuing economic interests, wherever possible, with all nations of the world – except in those instances where this course clearly threatened to damage relations with the United States, and
3. Procuring resources overseas and securing access to foreign technology and markets as part of an overall strategy of achieving high growth.

In sum, the pursuit of peace and economic prosperity based on cooperative relations with Washington have become such important objectives of post-war Japanese foreign/defence policy that all the other values have been subordinated to those ends. It is natural for a country whose people have been so devastated by cruel irrational warfare to regard peace and economic prosperity as crucial. Japan's average life expectancy at the end of World War II was 27 years for men, and even for women not directly involved in fighting, it was less than 37 years. Altogether 350 000 people including non-Japanese like Koreans and Chinese were victims of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and another 340 000 *hibakusha* or survivors of bombs still

(July 1988) pp.517-541. A good summation on this point is found in Denis T. Yasumoto, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), especially pp.33-44.

² See Fuji Kamiya, *Sengoshi no naka no nichibei kankei (The US-Japan Relations in Postwar History)* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1989).

³ See Daniel I. Okimoto, 'Introduction', in Daniel I. Okimoto, ed., *Japan's Economy: Coping with Changes in the International Economy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p.1.

live in the shadows of hereditary disease like the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident⁴. The Japanese Government spent about half the GNP on war preparedness in the last years of the war. Many people were starving when the war ended. Thus, what remained was a Japan with its GNP per capita below that of Brazil or Malaysia, with close to 3 million people killed in war, and with its international reputation degraded as an international outlaw⁵.

For a country whose energy and food supply depend greatly upon outside supply (for example 99.7% of oil, and more than one-third of foodstuffs coming from overseas), access to energy supplies and a free trade movement were critical. The great lesson learned from the tragic war, which was deeply ingrained in the Japanese people's psyche, is that 'Japan cannot achieve this necessary access to the world economy by the use of military force'. It was only logical, therefore, that Tokyo avoided 'as much as possible any military role in international politics' by relying on 'peaceful, non-military means to build [its] economy'⁶. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, serving the nation from 1948 to 1954, embodied this national psyche in his foreign policy doctrine. Later termed the 'Yoshida Doctrine', foreign policy was based on the closest ties with the United States, low-level military expenditure in relation to economic size, and non-military, low-key, low-profile attitudes towards international disputes.

Rapidly changing international circumstances as well as the domestic political situation assisted the development and maintenance of the Yoshida Doctrine. The Cold War had set in during the late 1940s, and it became a hot war between the Communists and non-Communists in the Korean peninsula (1950-1953). The largely loose bipolar international political system made it necessary for Washington to obtain access to all-important bases in Japan, and made Washington a vital ally of the Japanese Government. Indeed, the US-Japan cooperative relations became the central pillar of Japanese diplomacy, more important than the 'official' Japanese emphases on the UN, or the 'Japan in Asia' theme⁷.

Japan accepted a meaningful role in US post-war security policy. During the Cold War, American foreign policy was based on (1) pursuit of globalism and rejection of prewar isolationism, (2) anti-communism, and (3) the containment of the Soviet Union that was believed to be the 'spearhead' of the communist menace⁸. With the impact of the Cold War in East Asia, it became necessary for Washington to abandon the first 'D'-policy towards Japan: instead of maintaining de-militarisation of Japan, the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were gradually developed to rebuff the communist threats. The US defence policy needed a democratised, and partly re-armed, Japan.

⁴ The figures cited above come from the lecture of Masao Kunihiro in Sophia University, Tokyo in May 1980, and *imidas* '96, p.370.

⁵ Japan's per capita GNP is cited in David B. Yoffie, 'Protecting World Markets' in Thomas K. McGraw, ed., *America versus Japan* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1986), p.45.

⁶ Martin Weinstein, 'Japan's Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States' in Gerald Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1993), p.219.

⁷ Michael Blaker, 'Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance' in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p.3.

⁸ See Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkoph, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Practice* (4th ed.) (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

The Eisenhower administration, concerned about the low level of military spending, pressured Tokyo to do more in defence. The new Japanese constitution, drafted largely by the American Occupation personnel was, however, firmly engraved in Japanese society, and contributed to deflecting pressures from the US.

Japanese military build-up has been constrained by the Constitution. Its Article 9, the so-called 'peace clause', declares that 'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.' This clause attracted popular support from the Japanese who were afflicted by memories of the war and the great pains inflicted on the masses inside and outside of Japan. Any prospective revision of Article 9 meant opening Pandora's box.

What has bedevilled Japanese defence relations is the gap between Article 9 and the Treaty, and between Article 9 and the SDF. The Japanese Government has asserted that the 'peace clause' is not incompatible with the right of self-defence inherent in any sovereign state, and this has become the rationale for the SDF and the Treaty. At the same time, Tokyo has taken the position that the Constitution prohibits Japan from exercising the right of 'collective self-defence'. Thus, Japan's inclusion in a NATO-type collective security scheme is ruled out. Likewise, dispatch of the SDF for overtly offensive military purposes is also considered unconstitutional.

Considering the domestic circumstances, any change in the 'peace clause' seemed impossible. Within Japanese political circles, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, or presently Social Democratic Party of Japan, SDPJ) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) were bitterly opposed to abolishing or re-drafting Article 9 of the Constitution. Even the right-wing ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a sizeable number of members objecting the revision of Article 9, even though the Party's official platform included revision. But revision during the Cold War was unrealisable due to the tight rule for amendment of the Constitution: Article 96 stipulates that 'a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House' is needed to initiate amendments to the Constitution, and a special national referendum in which the 'affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon' is required to ratify the amendments.

In short, the domestic situation in Japan did not allow a larger role for Japan in the Cold War, nor did Japanese-American relations codified in the Security Treaty sanction Tokyo to bypass the Americans and seek independent policies in the world. Thus Cold War bipolarity, and Japan's close ties with the United States, plus the pacifist orientation of Japanese society, provided the stability, passivity and continuity in Japan's external policy.

There is evidence for this description in many case studies of Japanese external policy. For example, delving into the records of Japanese summit diplomacy in the Group of Seven (G7) from 1975 to 1987 discloses Japan as a passive state fearful of diplomatic isolation. It was far from proactive, not willing to pursue a brave political leadership

in resolution of international conflicts, or improvement of the international political economy⁹.

Similarly, Michael Blaker concludes in his treatment of Japan's Seabed foreign policy in the UN and its response to the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis/War that Japan's diplomatic style can be summed up as one of 'coping'¹⁰. Coping, here, can be defined as 'carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about the situation faced, and then performing the minimum adjustments needed to neutralise or overcome criticism and adapt to the existing situation with the fewest risks'¹¹. This is not the formula for a Japan acting boldly with a view to creating and/or maintaining a stable order on behalf of the international community.

There are, nevertheless, some positive elements in the Yoshida Doctrine of low-cost, low-key, low-profile foreign policy style in pursuit of economic prosperity at home. In the post-war period, Japan has never waged war, has refrained from exporting weapons to dangerous areas of the world, and since the 1970s it has been spending effectively around 1% of its GNP on official military expenditure, thereby underpinning an exclusively defence-oriented policy (*senshuboei*). It has not been intent on becoming a military power 'that might pose a threat to other countries'¹². It also belongs to the one-quarter of all nation-states in the world that declared compulsory jurisdiction of the optional clause, meaning Japan accepts the jurisdiction of the judgements of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Among the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, only the United Kingdom has abided by the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

In addition, Japan has repeatedly proclaimed that it has no intention of ever developing nuclear weapons. Indeed, it has adhered to 'three non-nuclear principles' – i.e., not possessing nuclear weapons, not manufacturing them, not permitting their introduction in Japan¹³. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s, however, there emerged a group of Japanese scholars who advocated that Japan should go nuclear¹⁴; but their influence has waned greatly since then, and virtually very few in political, academic or governmental circles now agree with their opinion. Japan is unlikely to go nuclear except in the most extreme cases. Mataka Kamiya depicts a three-part scenario of possible Japanese nuclear armament if (1) Russia or China or a nuclear-armed North Korea blackmails or threatens to attack

⁹ See Daizo Sakurada, *Japan and the Management of the International Political Economy: Japan's Seven Power Summit Diplomacy* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies and Joint Centre on Asia-Pacific Studies, University of Toronto, Country Study Number Six, 1989), especially pp.104-105.

¹⁰ See Blaker, 'Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance'.

¹¹ Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance", p.3.

¹² This is also the official line of the Japanese Government. See Japan, Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1995* (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1996), pp.63-64.

¹³ Japan, Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1995*, p.62.

¹⁴ Ikutaro Shimizu, 'Kaku no sentaku' (Option for Nuclear Weapons), *Shokun* (July 1980), pp.22-104. In it, he assumed the military balance of power between the US and USSR has tilted towards the latter's favour, and proposes that Japan should go nuclear in order to make up for the 'vulnerability' that Japan has. His main reasoning for Japanese nuclear armaments, however, vanished with the collapse of the 'Soviet threat' in the 1990s.

Japan with nuclear weapons and (2) the US nuclear umbrella malfunctions or (3) the US compels Japan to acquiesce in intolerable concessions on trade and other issues as a quid pro quo for provision of its nuclear umbrella¹⁵.

At the other extreme, during the Cold War, stood Japanese pacifists with an isolationist proclivity. The JSP was the party reflecting the pacifist sentiments in Japanese society. Its official platform on defence policy included until recently the 'unarmed neutrality' policy in which 'other nations would respect Japan's high pacifist ideals and not attack it'¹⁶.

The policy derived from both the perception of absence of threats to Japan from the Eastern 'communist countries', and a naive feeling among Japanese citizens that Japan could avoid war if it unilaterally renounced the right to wage war, the Self-Defence Forces and US-Japan Security Treaty. Underlying this unarmed neutrality logic was a benign, even favourable, image of the neighbouring communist states of the USSR, People's Republic of China, and North Korea, and an illusion that Japan could become a Swiss-type neutral nation. Such thinking seems to have been born out of the peculiar Japanese historical and strategic environment. Except for the Mongolian attacks in the 13th century and defeat of World War II, Japan has never been invaded by a foreign state – rather, it was Japan that brought about the catastrophic war in the Pacific, and caused so much misery and damage in its Pacific neighbours and on Allied forces.

Pacifists thought that semi-isolationism could protect Japan from involvement in any war-making adventures. They did not trust the theory of deterrence sustained by nuclear military preparedness, nor did they acknowledge the balance of power logic inherent in the anarchic nature of international politics. Likewise, they disregarded the Morgenthauian axiom that 'Men do not fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight.'¹⁷ Although never having been serious challengers for control over Tokyo's defence planning during the Cold War, the extreme schools of thought, nuclearists and pacifists, did help to obstruct healthy debate about Japan's security-related issues.

The end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on Japanese foreign and defence policies. In retrospect, the Cold War has provided Tokyo with the parameters within which it could safely conduct its external policy. Japan was not a military superpower that could behave like a policeman in the Asia-Pacific region, nor did it make a substantial military contribution outside the US-Japan security framework

¹⁵ See his excellent article: Mataka Kamiya, 'Will Japan Go Nuclear? Myth and Reality' *CSS Working Paper 1/95* (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, 1995), especially pp.12-13.

¹⁶ Edwin Reischauer, *The Japanese* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.346. For 'Unarmed neutrality' theory by a major politician, see Masahi Ishibashi, *Hibuso churitsu ron (The Theory of Unarmed Neutrality)* (Tokyo: Nihon Shakaito Chuohonbu Kikanshikyoku, 1980). Also the logic of unarmed neutrality was used for the arguments against the US-Japan Security Treaty; see Shin'kichi Eto and Yoshinobu Yamamoto, *Sogo anpo to mirai no sentaku (Comprehensive Security and Future Choices)* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991), p.127.

¹⁷ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th edition)* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p.398.

expected of Japan¹⁸ in the midst of the Cold War. The Cold War was the struggle between two superpowers as well as two incompatible ideologies. The demise of the Cold War in 1989-1991 implied a triumph of the United States against the Soviet Union as shown by the destruction of the three pillars of Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist communism. The Soviet Union had operated on (1) one-party dictatorship of the proletariat, (2) public ownership of the means of production, and (3) control by a centrally planned economy¹⁹. Almost all Eastern European states formerly associated with these pillars were transformed into liberal economies with a pluralistic polity. Apart from such staunch communist states as North Korea and Cuba, all other communist countries have undergone enormous economic liberalisation. China and Vietnam have not yet replaced one-party dictatorship of the proletariat with a full liberal pluralistic democracy, but their economic systems now largely run on free market principles.

The end of the Cold War has created challenges as well as opportunities for Tokyo's diplomacy. It means that Japan can pursue a new direction in world affairs – gone are the days when Japan's low-key, passive following of the US strategy was the only discernible option. The new world order has provided Japan with more room for manoeuvre, if it wants to take it, and possible departure from the stable but uninspiring Japanese way of 'coping' with the international situation in an ad hoc way. In addition, global expectations of Japan have heightened as it has achieved the position of an economic superpower, accounting for some 18% of the total GDP of the globe, becoming the world's number one foreign aid giver, and number two contributor to the UN budget. The Japanese responsibilities have increased as American economic dominance has diminished, and the relative American economic decline has been manifest in several areas.

At the same time, however, new challenges to the Japanese foreign and defence policies in the post-Cold War era have emerged. Low politics have replaced high politics, or at least the distinctions between politico-security issues, and purely economic issues and/or other issues, have become blurred. As a result, economic competition between allies has become intense. This is manifested particularly in US-Japan economic conflict. The US has run large trade deficits with Japan over several years, and 1994 marked a trade deficit of US\$55 billion for America²⁰. The US has accused Japan of closed markets, non-tariff barriers represented by the *keiretsu* business system, and a lower level of spending. Japan, on the other hand, retorts that US companies' efforts to break into Japanese markets are actually insufficient, and that the Americans should spend less and save more to balance the budget and trade deficits²¹. Each accuses the other of wrongdoings. The trade frictions have shown no signs of abating.

¹⁸ Tetsuya Umemoto, 'Anzen hoshō to kokusai koken' (National Security and International Contributions) in Atushi Kusano and Tetsuya Umemoto, eds, *Gendai nihon gaiko no bunskei (The Analysis of Contemporary Japanese Diplomacy)* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), p.111.

¹⁹ See Yutaka Akino's chapter on Soviet politics in Hideo Sato, ed., *Kokusai kankei nyūmon (Introduction to International Relations)* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991).

²⁰ Asahi Shimbunsha, *Asahi Nenkan (The Asahi Yearbook)* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1996), p.689.

²¹ For a good summary of the US-Japan economic conflicts, see Kotaro Ochai, *Nichibei keizai masatu (US-Japan Economic Conflicts)* (Tokyo: Keio tsushin, 1993).

Of greater concern is that the collapse of the USSR as a threat to Washington has meant that some people in the United States have started to regard Japan as a potential menace to the US. This is confirmed by some public opinion polls: 82.5% of the American people polled in 1990 cited Japan as a threat to the US economy, 75% in 1990 said the Japanese economic menace was greater than the military menace of the former Soviet Union. Asked if US-Japan relations were going well, 48% of the respondents in the US answered negatively in a December 1992 poll, and a September 1994 poll showed only 10% of Americans registered Japan among the top five countries they trusted most, down from 23% a decade earlier²². The book by George Friedman and Meredith LeBarb entitled *Coming War With Japan* (1991) described the worst case scenario of actual war fought between two economic giants across the Pacific²³.

The Gulf Crisis and subsequent War tested the bonds between the two powers. Japan failed the test, at least in the short run. Although Iraq's invasion of Kuwait directly affected Japan's vital national interests, as some 70% of Japanese imports of oil depended upon the Middle East region, Tokyo gave its political as well as financial support only grudgingly and slowly to the US-led multilateral enterprise. Soon after the invasion, Japan announced economic sanctions against Baghdad in conjunction with other states. But the constitutional constraints ingrained in Article 9 and the pacifist-oriented domestic political context prevented dispatch of the SDF to the region even for logistical support as part of the multilateral force. The government's proposed 'UN Peace Cooperation Bill' to permit noncombatant SDF personnel to be sent to the Gulf did not pass through the Japanese Diet in time due to lack of domestic consensus. Japan did dispatch a small group of medical doctors and nurses to the region, and in the end spent US\$13 billion, or some 20% of the total cost of Operation Desert Storm. But Japan had been the target of severe criticism of Washington, and was not identified by Kuwait among the states to whom it expressed gratitude after the restoration of its sovereignty²⁴. Naturally, a bitter taste remains in the mouths of Japanese officials over this crass oversight.

In retrospect, the Gulf War constitutes a turning point for Japanese external policies. Japan failed to perform a proper role, partly because it was kept in the dark about the situation. Japanese officials found it extremely difficult to collect proper information to respond to the changing circumstances because Tokyo's non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council had just expired. This reinforced the

²² The figures cited in Eto and Yamamoto, *Sogo anpo to mirai no sentaku*, p.456, and Kurt Tong, *Time for Plan C: An Essay on America's Japan Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, 1996), p.2; and Richard Leitch, Akira Kato, and Martin Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), p.161.

²³ See George Friedman and Meredith LeBarb, *Coming War With Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). In it, they cite the disappearance of American defence of Japan as a result of Soviet collapse and the zero-sum struggle between the US and Japan on economic issues as shown in Japan's huge trade surpluses against the US as reasons for the rupture. More militarised Japan, according to them, will clash with Washington on irreconcilable differences.

²⁴ For the Japanese diplomacy in the Gulf War, see Blaker, 'Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance', pp.16-42; Gerald Curtis, 'Introduction', in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp.xvi-xvii; Ryuichi Teshima, *1991 nen nihon no haiboku (The Year 1991: The Defeat of Japan)* (Tokyo: Shinchobunko, 1996); and Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, especially pp.43-45.

genuine wish, especially from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to secure permanent membership of the Security Council.

All this rekindled the debate in domestic political circles about the proper role that Japan should play in the world, many now acknowledging that Japan should do more than pursue 'chequebook diplomacy' if it wanted to be better regarded in the international arena²⁵. Japan's direct involvement commenced with the dispatch of six mine-sweeping vessels to destroy mines in the Persian Gulf at the request of Saudi Arabia in April 1991²⁶. After a long period of domestic controversy, the 'International Peace Cooperation Law', specifying five principles for Japan's participation in peace-keeping operations (PKO), went into effect in August 1992. It requires (1) agreement on a cease-fire among the parties to the conflict; (2) their consent to deployment of a peace-keeping force and Japan's participation in that force, (3) maintenance of strict impartiality of the peace-keeping force, (4) the withdrawal of the Japanese contingent in the case of the breach of any of the above conditions, and (5) limitation of the use of weapons to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc. In keeping with these conditions, Tokyo dispatched contingents and personnel to Cambodia for about one year from September 1992; to Mozambique from May 1993 to January 1995; and to Zaire and Kenya from September to December 1994²⁷. SDF's participation in the Golan Heights' PKO was added to this list from January 1996.

These more active involvements in international peace-keeping took place against the background of a changing domestic political context. The Japanese political system was traditionally one of the most stable democracies in the world. The 'One-Party Dominant Regime'²⁸ was reinforced by the absence of credible (at least to the electorate) alternative parties that could effectively govern. The JCP was too self-righteous and class-oriented to attract widespread support from the electorate. Both *Komeito* (Clean Government Party) and the Democratic Socialist Party were de facto regional parties with each fewer than 105 candidates standing for elections that chose 500 MPs. The JSP could field candidates nationwide, but had only one-third of the total members of the Lower House²⁹.

Table 1 illustrates this point more vividly. From the elections of 1958 (after the JSP and LDP were formed in 1955) until those of 1990, the number of LDP and other

²⁵ See Tetsuya Kataoka, *Sayonara Yoshida Shigeru (Farewell to Shigeru Yoshida)* (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1991); and Yoshio Katayama, 'Japan's Role in Global Security: Her Response to the Gulf War and Strategy in the Future', Department of Political Studies, Auckland University, mimeo, n.d.

²⁶ Yasuhiro Ueki, 'Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism', in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp.360, 369, fn.23. Ryutaro Hashimoto, the present Prime Minister, also implicitly rejects chequebook diplomacy in his book. See Ryutaro Hashimoto, *VISION OF JAPAN: Waga kyuchu ni seisaku arite (A Realistic Direction for the 21st Century)* (Tokyo: KK Besutoserazu, 1993), pp106-107.

²⁷ See Japan, Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp.98-99.

²⁸ The phrase is taken from the book edited by T.J. Pempel. See his *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

²⁹ See Masumi Ishikawa, *Sengo seijishi (Postwar Japanese Political History)* (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1995); and Seizaburo Sato, 'Japan's Democracy in Crisis: The New Tide in Japanese Politics', *Asia-Pacific Review* 2.2 (Autumn/Winter, 1995), especially pp.22-23.

Table 1. Japanese House of Representatives Election Outcomes, 1958 - 1993.

Election	Party	Candidates	Seats won	Election	Party	Candidates	Seats won	Election	Party	Candidates	Seats won		
22 May 1958	LDP	413	287	10 Dec 1972	LDP	339	271	18 Dec 1983	LDP	339	250		
	JSP	246	166		JSP	161	118		NLC	17	8		
	JCP	114	1		<i>Komeito</i>	59	29		JSP	144	112		
	Other	178	13		DSP	65	19		<i>Komeito</i>	59	58		
	Total	951	467		JCP	122	38		DSP	54	38		
20 Nov 1960	LDP	399	296	5 Dec 1976	Other	149	16	JCP	129	26			
	JSP	186	145		Total	895	491	<i>Shaminren</i>	4	3			
	DSP	105	17		LDP	320	249	Other	102	16			
	JCP	118	3		NLC	25	17	Total	848	511			
	Other	132	6		JSP	162	123	6 Jul 1986	LDP	322	300		
Total	940	467	<i>Komeito</i>	84	55	NLC	12		6				
21 Nov 1963	LDP	359	283	DSP	51	29	JSP		138	85			
	JSP	198	144	JCP	128	17	<i>Komeito</i>		61	56			
	DSP	59	23	Other	129	21	DSP		56	26			
	JCP	118	5	Total	899	511	JCP	129	26				
	Other	183	12	7 Oct 1979	LDP	322	248	<i>Shaminren</i>	5	4			
Total	917	467	NLC		31	4	Other	115	9				
29 Jan 1967	LDP	342	277		JSP	157	107	Total	838	512			
	JSP	209	140		<i>Komeito</i>	64	57	18 Feb 1990	LDP	338	275		
	<i>Komeito</i>	32	25		DSP	53	35		PC	7	1		
	DSP	60	30	JCP	128	39	JSP		149	136			
	JCP	123	5	<i>Shaminren</i>	7	2	<i>Komeito</i>		58	45			
Other	151	9	Other	129	19	DSP	44		14				
Total	917	486	Total	891	511	JCP	131	16					
27 Dec 1969	LDP	328	288	22 Jun 1980	LDP	310	284	<i>Shaminren</i>	6	4			
	JSP	183	90		NLC	25	12	Other	220	21			
	<i>Komeito</i>	76	47		JSP	149	107	Total	953	512			
	DSP	68	31		<i>Komeito</i>	64	33	LDP	285	223			
	JCP	123	14		DSP	50	32	JSP	142	70			
Other	167	16	JCP	129	29	<i>Shinseito</i>	69	55					
Total	945	486	<i>Shaminren</i>	5	3	<i>Komeito</i>	54	51					
18 Jul 1993				Other	103	11	JNP	57	35				
				Total	835	511	<i>Sakigake</i>	16	13				
											DSP	28	15
											JCP	129	15
											<i>Shaminren</i>	4	4
Other	171	30											
Total	955	511											

Note: Party: LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; JSP = Japan Socialist Party, or presently Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ); JCP = Japan Communist Party; DSP = Democratic Socialist Party; *Komeito* (= Clean Government Party); NLC = New Liberal Club; *Shaminren* (= Social Democratic Federation); PC = Progressive Party; *Shinseito* (= Japan Renewal Party); JNP = Japan New Party; *Sakigake* (= New Harbinger Party; Other includes other parties and Independents. Based on data from Masumi Ishikawa, *Sengo seijishi (Postwar Japanese History)* (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1995), pp.223-235.

conservative candidates fielded always outnumbered those of the opposition parties combined, and the LDP could win the overall majority of seats in all elections. Only when the ruling LDP became implicated in political scandals or was blamed for an unpopular tax increase, did it fail to garner more than 50% of seats in the powerful Lower House. On these occasions the LDP was flexible enough to include like-minded conservative independents (as was the case in the 1976 and 1979 elections), or form coalition governments (as happened after the 1983 election, with the New Liberal Club). In addition, differences on many crucial issues made it highly unlikely that the opposition parties could ever join forces to form a coalition regime. Continuation of LDP dominance in Parliament was a virtual certainty unless the LDP factions broke up.

That happened in 1993. Out of frustration over aborted political reform bills and scandals, 10 LDP Dietmen formed a new party, called *Saigake* (New Harbinger Party) at first, and 36 followed suit by forming *Shinseito* (Japan Renewal Party). The July 1993 general election created no clear majority to control the Lower House³⁰. The days had passed when the dominant Liberal Democratic Party could automatically rule by putting together a working majority, sometimes with the help of like-minded conservatives. A major realignment of Japanese parties followed, and the political situation has remained in flux up to the present. As a result, the SDPJ, long an advocate of pacifism, changed its anti-SDF, anti-US-Japan Security Treaty stances, and was included in the Hosokawa coalition administration, and later put together the three-party coalition with its chairperson, Tomiichi Murayama, as head of government in June 1994. Other parties, left out of the coalition (*Shinseito*, the Japan New Party, the DSP, and *Komeito*), founded an opposition party called the New Frontier Party in December 1994. This signified an emerging consensus in Japanese foreign and defence policy. Now, except for the JCP, all major political parties basically agree on the existence of the SDF and security pact with the US, and Japan's participation in UN peace-keeping operations³¹.

The domestic changes in Japan coincided with the demise of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has influenced Japan's domestic political scene in three important ways³². First, as discussed, it created the situation in which no crucial differences on defence posture prevailed among the major political parties bar the JCP. DSPJ's abandonment of the unarmed neutrality stance, and opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty, made it possible to turn itself into a strange bedfellow with its arch rival Liberal Democrats to form the Murayama and Hashimoto regimes. Second, the disappearance of discord with the Soviet Union also terminated the American automatic support for the LDP for fear of pro-socialist forces gaining strength in Japan. Last, for similar reasons, the endorsement of the LDP from Japan's business community waned. The outcome was the appearance of political parties other than the LDP that can effectively govern Japan.

³⁰ See Table 1 and also Ishikawa, *Sengo seijishi*, pp.185-187.

³¹ See Ishikawa, *Sengo seijishi*; and for a recent development, see Takashi Inoguchi, 'Nichibei shinan'po to nihon no sentaku' (The New US-Japan Security Treaty and Japan's Choices), *Ushio* (July, 1996), pp.86-93.

³² See Takashi Inoguchi, *Gendai nihongaiko: seikimatsu hendo no nakade* (*The Contemporary Japanese Diplomacy: In the Changes at the End of the Century*) (Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 1993), pp.275-284.

Against this backdrop, the emerging consensus on the broad pillars of Japan's external policies (represented by support for maintenance of the SDF and security pact with Washington) was a boon for Japan. What remained puzzling was the ideological hodgepodge of coalition politics. The coalition regime under Murayama's banner comprised the three heads of the political parties at that time: Murayama, Yohei Kone of the LDP, and Masayoshi Tekemura of *Sakigake*. They were all 'liberals', and basically in tune with one another over the major divisive political issues. They were, for instance, all opposed to the revision of the 'peace clause' of the Constitution. However, with Ryutaro Hashimoto, a more conservative leader, and pro-revisionist, as the president of the LDP, and later as Prime Minister of Japan after Murayama in January 1996, the picture becomes more blurred. For instance, in the last three years, on 130 different votes in the Diet, there have been direct violations of party discipline. Each party, except for the Japan Communist Party, has members with diverse opinions on crucial issues³³.

The reason for such diversity within the same party contradicts ideological conformity, but often lies in the peculiar political circumstances in individual electoral districts. It is not surprising, in this connection, that *Asahi Shimbun* deplored in its editorial on 18 July, 1996, that 'the most obvious misfortune of the last three years is that political realignment came about solely for the purpose of maintaining or regaining of power'. A more logical realignment of political parties based on more coherent political platforms, may need to await the next elections that the Prime Minister will have to call by mid-July 1997.

On the other hand, the debates among politicians, as well as the informed public, on Japan's global responsibilities, have become earnest, ranging from those of a 'normal' state actively engaged in security obligations under the banner of the United Nations, to a 'global civilian power' willing to 'civilianise' international society³⁴. The thorny issue of redrafting Article 9 of the Constitution is now being disputed in political circles as well. The introduction of a new electoral system combining proportional representation (200 seats) and single-member constituencies (300 seats) may not, however, produce a party with overall majority. Although the major political parties have converged on the issue of defence policy based on the status quo, Japanese political instability is likely to continue, at least up until the next election, or even for several years to come.

³³ See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1 July, 1996, pp.1-2 for the details.

³⁴ See Kiyohiko Fukushima, 'The Revival of "Big Politics" in Japan', *International Affairs* 72.1 (1996), pp.53-72, for a good summary. Futsu no kokka ron (Japan as a normal state argument) is suggested by Ichiro Ozawa in his *Blueprint for a new Japan: The rethinking of a nation*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1993); and Yoichi Funabashi, a prominent journalist of *Asahi Shimbun*, argues for Japan becoming 'a global civilian power'. See his *Nihon no taigaikoso: reiseigo no bijon wo kaku (Japan's External Strategy: Writing Blueprints After the Cold War)* (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1993). He adopted the concept of a 'global civilian power' from Hans Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, 69.5 (Winter 1990/91), pp.91-106.

3. Japanese Vulnerabilities in the Near Future

Some 'semi-constant' factors that are likely to influence Japanese external policy in the future need to be taken into account in considering Japan's strategy in the near future. Three vulnerabilities confronting Japan now, in particular, might constrain Japan's external behaviour. These are economic structural problems, demographic trends, and burgeoning public debt issues.

Since the beginning of 1996 Japan has slowly started to recover from the longest recession since World War II. The recession started with the end of the so-called 'bubble economy' in 1991, i.e., the sudden fall of such over-valued assets as land, stocks, and real estate. This ignited the recessive moods of consumers, and revealed bad debts amounting to some ¥4 trillion (US\$40 billion). The official unemployment rate hit the all-time high of 3.5%, and the two defining characteristics of Japanese management-labour system, life-long employment and pay scales based on seniority, began to crumble. The result was a heavy blow for the Japanese. The figure of 3.5% unemployment rate may seem very low by Western standards. But Japan's way of measuring the unemployment rate is the strictest among all OECD countries, and this factor, plus some cultural differences, may hide the real rate of unemployment. One government agency estimated real unemployment to be more than 9% or even nearing 10%³⁵. In short, Japan seems to follow the pattern of 'jobless economic recovery' seen in Europe since the 1980s.

More significant for the long term Japanese economic structure is the 'hollowing-out' of the Japanese manufacturing industrial base³⁶. The appreciation of the yen vis-a-vis the US dollar, the increase of imports from overseas due to Tokyo's economic deregulation, and the growth of the overseas manufacturing sector, all contributed to the retrenchment of domestic production and resultant job losses. The ratio of manufactured goods' imports into Japan is now registered at 59.1% in 1995, and some predict that it will grow to 70% in 2000. In the US, the ratio hit the 81.1% mark in 1986, and economists began talking about the 'hollowing-out' of the American industrial sector. One estimate suggests that overseas production as a share of all manufacturing in Japan will increase to 27.3% by March 1996 from 24.5% in 1994. All this meant that 1995 saw the loss of about 110 000 domestic jobs in Japan. 'Hollowing-out' must be reversed or Japan will be stricken with high unemployment in the future. There is widespread consensus that Japan needs to thoroughly restructure its economy to create more high value-added, capital-intensive goods and services in order to survive the competition in the twenty-first century.

Another ominous sign is the Japanese demographic trend. The share of youth (aged 0 to 14 years) in the total population in Japan has been declining over the years. It is now just 15.8% thanks to the low birthrate level. This translates into a rapidly aging Japanese society. In 2011, the aged population (older than 65 years) will be about

³⁵ See *The Economist*, 1 July, 1995, pp.24-25; and David Asher, 'What Became of the Japanese "Miracle"?', *Orbis* (Spring 1996), especially p.228.

³⁶ The following figures cited are taken from Asher, 'What became of the Japanese "Miracle"?', pp.227-230; and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 3 May, 1996, p.7, and 4 May, 1996, p.7, and 14 May, 1996, p.7.

21.4% of the population, and the share is expected to reach 25.9% in 2025³⁷. One out of four Japanese will thus be senior citizens. The picture suggests a greater toll on Japan's social security resources, slower pace of economic expansion due to the shrinking workforce, and accompanying social problems.

The accumulated budget deficits in Japan add to the list of Japanese problems³⁸. At the end of March, 1996, the net national indebtedness amounted to ¥442 trillion (US\$4.42 trillion), of which amount the central government bonds issued accounts for ¥241 trillion (US\$2.41 trillion). The national indebtedness (deficit) ratio to GDP in 1997 is projected to be 6.3%, meaning Japan is beset with the second heaviest national debt burden (after Italy) among all OECD countries. Some policy innovations to tackle these gigantic deficits are urgently required – *zaiseiseido shingikai* (Council on Budgetary Reform) proposed in its mid-term report that much public sector spending should be reduced. Masayoshi Takemura, former Finance Minister, recommended that the present 3% consumption tax should be raised to either 8, 10, or 12% from the year 2002. His proposals include a 20% salary cut for all Members of Parliament, and reduction in the number of both houses: from 500 to 300 in the Lower House, and from 250 to 150 in the Upper House³⁹. How to put such remedies into practice in the face of enormous objections deriving from vested interests, sabotage from the bureaucracy, and pervasive political difficulties is another matter. Even when any agreement is reached on how to cut back on the deficits, the consequences of the problem will haunt Japan. It will take at least one decade to remove the growing budget deficits.

These three factors destabilise Japan's more active involvement in world affairs. Although they are structural constraints with long term effects, courageous administrative as well as economic reforms are urgently required to sustain and expand desired Japanese activities abroad. An economically weak Japan will find it harder to continue its generous funding of foreign aid or contributions to UN budget⁴⁰. An aged Japanese society will deprive Japan of the necessary resources and vigour to actively pursue its external relations. A more inward-looking Japan may, as a result, emerge in the next century.

There are indicators that point in a different direction away from isolationism. Japan's dependence on foreign trade for its energy and food supply alone will make it almost impossible for Japan to go back to the seclusionism of Tokugawa Shogunate. Compared with resource-rich Australia or New Zealand, Japan's dependence on outsiders for survival is noteworthy. As the largest creditor and trade surplus nation,

³⁷ The figures cited come from *imidas '96*, p.596; and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 5 May, 1996, p.1.

³⁸ See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 11 July, 1996, pp.1, 3, 7-9; and Masayoshi Takemura, 'Konomamadewa kuni ga horobu: watashi no zaisei saiken keikaku' (Japan Will Be Bankrupt If the Present Situation Continues: My Budgetary Reform Plans), *Chuokoron* (July, 1996).

³⁹ See Masayoshi Takemura, 'Konomamadewa kuni ga horobu: watashi no zaisei saiken keikaku' (Japan Will Be Bankrupt If the Present Situation Continues: My Budgetary Reform Plans), *Chuokoron* (July, 1996), pp.36-50.

⁴⁰ There is already a sign of this. It was reported that the request for ODA budget in the fiscal year 1997 was increased by only 2.6%, the lowest figure in the postwar era, reflecting the tight budgetary situation. A concern was expressed that Japan might lose its useful diplomatic tool of aid resources. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 3 August, 1996, p.23.

Japan's 'sensitivity' dependence in normal international society is relatively small; but its 'vulnerability' dependence, arising from a crisis situation like world-wide food shortage, is dangerously large⁴¹. In this respect, there is no choice but for Japan to live with the world: it must address the anarchic nature of international society by fulfilling proper roles it is equipped to take. What, therefore, are some of the policy implications deriving from the changed domestic and international situation regarding Japan?

4. Consensus and Japan's Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

In the economically constraining, uncertain post-Cold War environment, a central requirement of Japanese external policy is national consensus⁴². Japan's actions abroad sustained by national consensus will be more reassuring; without consensus, Japan might have to retract promises it has already made, thereby diminishing the credibility of Japan in the world⁴³. In the period from the 1950s to the early 1960s, the Japanese domestic political scene was so divided over its external policy that Japan's parliamentary democracy was threatened. The treaty with the US was forcibly passed in a split Diet, and one result was the compelled resignation of the Kishi regime. A national consensus in Japan's post-Cold War strategy would be beneficial for Japan's international credibility and would contribute to domestic stability as well. Also, as outlined before, the 'failure' of Japanese diplomacy in the 1990-1991 Gulf War was caused by the absence of domestic consensus: the bureaucratic infighting between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance on the proper financial contributions resulted in an inertia which slighted cooperative efforts to restore order in the region⁴⁴.

The consensus must strike a middle point of balance in regard to Japan's external policies. Any attempt by Japan to become militarily too strong by acquiring 'offensive' weapons or even nuclear capabilities would backfire. Japan's remilitarisation in the absence of long overdue reparations for past wrongdoings in the Asia-Pacific region would undoubtedly inflate fears of neighbouring states and

⁴¹ 'Sensitivity' dependence is defined as 'liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation', while 'vulnerability' dependence means 'an actor's ability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered'. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence (2nd edition)* (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989), p.13. Hideo Sato argues in the late 1980s that Japan's 'sensitivity' dependence vis-a-vis that of the US is low, due to Japan's competitive edges over the US in many of its industrial sectors, as long as the US largely supports the free trading system. The adoption of US protectionism, however, increases Japan's 'vulnerability' dependence against the US, because almost all manufactured goods imported from Japan can be substitutionally made in the USA. See his *Taigaiseisaku (External Policy)* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989), pp.119-120.

⁴² Probably the first emphasis on the importance of forming 'consensus' in Japan's security policy was made by Shin'ichi Eto. See his classic book, *Nihon no shinro (Japan's Course)* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1969). Also see Eto and Yamamoto, *Sogoanpo to mirai no sentaku*, pp.557-558.

⁴³ The consensus in Japan's post-Cold War strategy also relieves Tokyo of the burdens of 'Level II (domestic ratification)' process of the agreements it has made with outsiders. For this point, see Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-Level Games', *International Organisation* 42.3 (Summer, 1988), pp.427-460.

⁴⁴ See Teshima, *1991 nen: nihon no haiboku*, especially Chap. 10.

damage relations⁴⁵. Sending the SDF for even *peace-making* missions to civil war-torn regions could also impede Japan's trustworthiness among its Asian neighbours by rekindling the images of Japan's atrocities during the War, and destroy national consensus on Japan's participation in the UN peace-keeping activities. Some insist that Japan needs to revise its Constitution in order to contribute more to security-related issues. It all depends on how to revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, but outright abolition of this peace clause to permit acquisition of overtly offensive military capabilities would cause more problems than it solves in the Asia-Pacific region⁴⁶. Any attempts to revise the peace clause would also destroy the emerging domestic consensus, which can otherwise underpin the basis for Japan's better strategy in the post-Cold War world.

At the same time, a continuation by Japan of the 'conscientious objector' role in the world, always dodging any security-related activities, and being forced by military superpowers to 'foot the operational bills' of others, would be equally unpalatable⁴⁷. It is highly unlikely that Japan can attract wide support from members of the international community by not taking a responsibility commensurate with its economic power. Procrastination in a crisis situation, as exemplified in the 'too little, too late' payment of financial contributions to the Gulf Crisis, would affect Japan's vital relations with Washington. The strategy of 'unarmed neutrality' once proclaimed by the SDPJ is now discredited. Also, the age of exclusive 'chequebook' diplomacy is no longer valid from the perspectives of domestic difficulties stemming from worsening budgetary, economic, and demographic situations described above.

The end of the Cold War did not signal the clear-cut demise of conflict in East Asia, as witnessed by the intrusion of Pyongyang's soldiers into the border truce zone in March and some covert submarine operations in September 1996. Confronting uncertainty in the East Asian region, Japan should, for the foreseeable future, stay on its course in international affairs, but with some adjustments. First and foremost, the US-Japan Security Treaty must remain the pillar of Japan's defence planning despite tragic incidents of the past, represented by rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl, and some vocal domestic pressures from both countries to abrogate it. Some bases in Okinawa will obviously have to be transferred as Clinton and Hashimoto agreed to in the April summit of 1996, and some even will have to be phased out in the events that the two Koreas are unified peacefully, and that China and Taiwan come towards a working accommodation. Still, US-Japan security cooperation, buttressed by the Treaty,

⁴⁵ Japanese compensations for the settlements of its behaviours during World War II are not yet over, although the peace treaties with all countries (except North Korea) which suffered from Japanese colonisations and/or atrocities solved government-to-government relations. Some sort of funds organised by Japanese NGOs and other methods of paying for compensations are required. For this issue, see Asahi shimbun sengo hosho mondai shuzaihan, *Sengo hosho towa nanika (What are the Post-World War II Reparations?)* (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1994).

⁴⁶ For one attempt to replace the peace clause with explicit mention of having the national military forces, see Nihon wo mamoru kokumin kaigi, et al., *Nihankoku shinkenpo seitei sengen (Declaration of Enactment of the New Japanese Constitution)* (Tokyo: Tokumashoten, 1994), especially pp.70-75.

⁴⁷ Yoichi Funabashi equates Japan's non-contribution in security affairs as one of a 'conscientious objector', but cites lack of common acknowledgment and equivalents of military services in burden-sharing for Japan from the international society, as the reasons why this strategy does not work. See his *Nihon no taigaikoso*, pp.201-202. For similar assessment, see Eto and Yamamoto, *Sogoanpo to mirai no sentaku*, p.566.

stabilises the region by affording continued protection by the American deterrent, with American forces stationed in Japan.

The Treaty limits the area of its application to the Far East. Japanese military response is required only when Japan itself is attacked. It does not extend to the territories under administration by the US, if or when they are attacked. The Treaty proclaims that '[both the US and Japan] recognise[s] that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declare[s] that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes'. Some Americans accuse Japan of failing to shoulder its fair share of the security burden because a military attack on American soil does not implicate the Japanese SDF in terms of the Treaty. In this respect, the Treaty is not 'reciprocal: the US is pledged to defend Japan, but not vice versa'⁴⁸.

Nevertheless, the Americans derive advantage from the Treaty. The view that Japan does not, or did not, have to defend the US is misguided. If war had broken out between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, the conflict would have attracted attacks on the US (and Japanese) forces stationed in Japan. This would have entailed automatic Japanese involvement on the US side against Moscow. Under the Treaty, Japan is not obliged to send its forces to defend American soil, and neither are South Korea or the Philippines so obliged⁴⁹.

Relative American economic decline necessitates greater financial burden-sharing for Tokyo. Japan now spends some US\$6 billion per year (or more than 70% of the total stationing cost) to maintain US troops, the highest amount paid of all American strategic allies. Germany, for example, pays only US\$ billion each year to cover the cost for 80 000 GIs on its territory⁵⁰. The cost to the US military would be far greater if the marines stationed in Okinawa were returned to the US⁵¹. Japan has also accommodated training exercises for the US forces despite problems like noise pollution and the risk of accidents for some local people⁵². Japan has shouldered its burdens in this way, too.

What is the alternative to the US-Japan Security Treaty, were it to be abolished? The withdrawal of bases from Japan implies the rebirth of US isolationism. The US may

⁴⁸ Bruce Stokes, 'Divergent Paths: US-Japan Relations Towards the Twenty-First Century', *International Affairs*, 72.2 (April, 1996), p.289. See also Eto and Yamamoto, *Sogoanpo to mirai no sentaku*, p.588.

⁴⁹ See Shunji Taoka, 'Zainichi beigun no sonzai riyu wo tou' (Asking the *Raison d'Etre* of American Forces Stationed in Japan), *Sekai* (July, 1996), p.68. He also suspects that even Western European nations under the NATO scheme have the capabilities to go over to the US mainland to defend attacks from the Eastern bloc during the Cold War.

⁵⁰ See Patrick Cronin, 'The Future of the Japan-US Alliance', *Asia-Pacific Review*, 2,1 (Spring, 1995), p.32; and *Strait Times*, 19 April, 1996.

⁵¹ This is the information given to Governor Masahide Ota of Okinawa by the US military. See his interview in 'Okinawa no mirai wa hondo no minshushugi no chikara ni kakatteimasu' (The future of Okinawa depends on the power of democracy in other parts of Japan), *Sekei* (July, 1996), p.84.

⁵² The low-level flying exercises conducted by the US forces in Japan have caused a controversy in its training route due to its sounds and danger. Taoka thinks this type of training is intended for conflicts in the Korean peninsula, and not for the direct defence of Japan per se. See his 'Zainichi beigun no sonzai riyu wo tou', p.66.

withdraw forward deployment forces to as far back as Hawaii. The Korean-stationed US troops would, in such circumstances, be isolated. Despite prevalent myths, the US-Japan Security Treaty has proven to be balanced; the benefits both to Japan and to the US are, on the whole, equitable⁵³.

Redrafting the security pact in a way to reinforce Japan's military involvement in the Asia-Pacific region would destabilise the regional order. Many Asian countries, notably the two Koreas and China, would reject the idea of a more active Japanese SDF involvement in actual combatant operations in the region. In this sense, endorsement of 'collective self-defence' so as to allow Japanese soldiers to be engaged in collaborative offensive actions with the US forces in the region is not to be preferred, either. In place of a NATO-type collective security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region, the present US-Japan Security Treaty, with all its limitations of applicability to the Far East, can provide the essential guarantee of 'keeping the Americans in, and the Japanese remilitarisation down'⁵⁴.

The Treaty has functioned as a sort of 'insurance' policy for stabilising the region, too. That is why the 1996 reconfirmation of the Treaty between Washington and Tokyo has been generally welcomed by Asian neighbours. Beijing does not diametrically object to the reconfirmation of the US-Japan Security Treaty as long as the Treaty is not directed against China⁵⁵. The use of the treaty to explicitly 'contain' or provide a power balance against China would, however, harden China's views against the Treaty. Beijing would resist Japan's involvements in any 'containment' policy alongside the US. Any unnecessary and unjustified perception of a 'Chinese threat' would ignite a resultant arms race in East Asia. Japan's role in US-China relations, therefore, lies in playing the part of a bridge or intermediary between the two.

As for the 1996 shelling in the Taiwan Straits, the intention of Beijing seems to have been to send the right message (no independence) to the independent-minded Taiwanese⁵⁶, and overt military invasion is unlikely to be in the offing. A comparison of the present conventional combatant capabilities between China and Taiwan reveals the superiority of Taiwan⁵⁷. In view of the validity of 'constructive engagement' policy towards China, intentional exaggeration of a Chinese menace by enlarging the

⁵³ For the details of the perspective, see Daizo Sakurada, 'Why We Need The US-Japan Security Treaty: A Japanese Perspective', *CSS Working Paper, 1/97* (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, forthcoming, 1997).

⁵⁴ 'The cap in the bottle' metaphor used by a US serviceman stationed in Japan is useful to assuring the Asian neighbours of Japan not acquiring overt military preparedness of an offensive nature. For this metaphor, see Chalmers Johnson, 'The Okinawa Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia', *Quadrant* (March 1996), p.28.

⁵⁵ See Inoguchi, 'Nichibei shin'ampo to nihon no sentaku', p.89.

⁵⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1 May, 1996, p.4, reports that a head of Taiwanese operations in Fujian Province said to a group of Taiwanese investors visiting the province that 'Do not worry; the missiles (shot at Taiwan Strait) [are] intended to get the idea across to Li Denghui, and it is not directed at the Taiwanese people and you'.

⁵⁷ Kensuke Ebata, a prominent Japanese military strategist, predicts that one-third to one-quarter of all Chinese military forces would be lost if direct invasion on Taiwan happened. See his *Nihon ga gunjitaikoku ni naru hi (The Day When Japan Will Become a Military Great Power)* (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 1994), pp.14-15. Takashi Inoguchi thinks that Taiwan has a short-term military edge over China. See his 'Nichibei shin'ampo to nihon no sentaku', p.90.

functions of the Treaty to explicitly go against China is the last thing needed⁵⁸. What Japan can and should do to relax tensions in the Taiwan-China bilateral relationship is to further promote exchanges in political fields between the two so that no military solution of the 'two Chinas' conflict will dare occur⁵⁹. Also, 'diplomacy of constraint' on any American inflation of perceived Chinese threat would assist Japan maintain regional stability.

Public opinion in the US and Japan endorses the present form of the Treaty⁶⁰. After its 1996 reconfirmation, 62% of the Japanese surveyed thought the pact helpful for Japan's security. Another opinion poll, published in the 15 May 1996 issue of *Asahi Shimbun*, shows 70% of the Japanese agreeing to the maintenance of the pact. On their side, 75% of the American public and 85% of the American elite endorse the maintenance of the Treaty.

A key question that remains is what Japanese contribution would be forthcoming to American strategy in the event of war initiated by an aggressor in the Korean peninsula?⁶¹ Simply put, Japan could hardly sit idly by if the US was implicated in military conflicts started by an aggressor in the region. At the very minimum, some kind of logistical support should be possible under the present constitutional parameters⁶².

In the post-Cold War era, no clear-cut order has emerged in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan must, therefore, be involved more internationally in fields where it can help to build a safer and better world and region. More active participation in international

⁵⁸ Chinese national power, especially its 'hard power' including military capability, is not a present 'threat' for the region. For a Japanese perspective against a 'Chinese military threat', see, for example, Kazuko Mori, 'Futeikei no ajia: chugoku wa "kyoi"ka' (Unformed Asia: Is China a "Threat"?), *Sekai* (March, 1996), pp.41-48. A similar argument against exaggerated 'Chinese threat' is offered by Ikuo Kayahara. See his 'Chugoku no kokubo kindaika no doko to sono eikyo: saikin no chugoku kyoiron ni kanrenshite' (Modernization in the People's Liberation Army and Its Influence on Regional and World Security), *Shin Boei Ronshu (The Journal of National Defence)*, 21.4 (March 1994), pp.59-80. However, more transparency in Chinese military-related activities will be required to root out the 'Chinese threat'. For a different summary of Japanese views on Chinese uncertainty in the region, see Michael Green and Benjamin Self, 'Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism', *Survival*, 38.2 (Summer, 1996), especially pp.42-45.

⁵⁹ Japan's endeavours to reinforce the Taiwanese-Chinese exchanges in political fields were suggested by Akihiko Tanaka. See Tatsuo Yamada, Satoshi Amako, and Akihiko Tanaka, 'Zadankai, Henyosuru? chugoku toiu shisutemu: Nihon wa "tsuyoi chugoku" to ikani renkei subekika?' (Roundtable-talk, Changing China as a System? How Should Japan be Engaged with a "Strong China"?), *Sekai* (March 1996), p.37.

⁶⁰ See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 24 April, 1996, p.2; and 3 May, p.1, for the public opinion figures. The 15 May *Asahi Shimbun*'s figure is taken from Taoka, 'Zainichi beigun no sonzai riyu wo tou', p.61.

⁶¹ Judging from military potentials on North Korea, it is highly unlikely that the North would attack the South in the near future. There is a report that North Korea's oil stockpile, for one, is not large enough to launch an attack. See Toshimitsu Shigemura, 'Chosenhanto "yuji" wa nai' (There will be No Emergency in the Korean Peninsula), *Chuokoron* (July 1996), pp.92-101. Shunji Taoka also thinks it is unlikely for North Korea to go to war with South Korea at the present stage, but predicts quick victory for the combined forces of South Korea and the US. See his 'Zainichi beigun no sonzai riyu wo tou', p.69.

⁶² See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 May, 1996, p.1; and Yukio Okamoto, 'C.jonson "nichibei anpo kaitairon" no ayamari' (C. Johnson's "Dismantling the US-Japan Security Treaty" Thesis's Fallacies), *Chuokoron* (July 1995), especially p.95.

affairs in the form of *peace-keeping* activities based on five PKO principles, for instance, will not be inconsistent with the security pact with the US or the Constitution⁶³. Revision of Article 9 of the Constitution and/or the US-Japan Security Treaty to counter the traditional Japanese passiveness is not the answer. This paper proposes that Japan's post-Cold War strategy be set clearly within current security frameworks. The strategy discussed here also rejects 'chequebook' diplomacy and unarmed neutrality of the Cold War kind. Discarding the low-key, low-cost, low-profile 'coping' style of diplomacy, Japan needs to maintain and expand its activities in world and regional affairs in any peaceful way it can.

5. Canada-US Relations and Japan-US Relations

What strategy, then, can Japan take in the uncertain age of the Post-Cold War? Japan's Cold War 'reactive' style of diplomacy underpinned the early years of the Japan-US relationship, and has shaped its character and reality. This means Japan's options for the future depends to a large extent on how to handle its American policy. One answer, thus, lies in policy implications learned from the state situated in similar surroundings as Japan. In terms of the overall importance of the US on their calculations of policy-making processes and dependence on Washington for healthy development of trade and security, Canada and Japan share many lessons in the international arena⁶⁴. For Canada and Japan, the US is the largest trading partner; and for the US, Canada and Japan rank respectively number one and two in its trade relations. Altogether the three countries produce about 44% of the GDP of the globe. In security terms, too, Canada and Japan need Washington for their survival, and the two countries' importance to American global strategy cannot be dismissed lightly.

Japanese-American relations, however, have not advanced to the level of the Canadian-American relationship characterised by partnership based on separate identity and strategy. Canada has experienced the most severe conflicts with its southern neighbour, but maintained an overall amity in the relationship without compromising its independent stance on many issues. What, thus, can Tokyo learn from Ottawa's dealings with Washington for the future?

James Earys classified Canada's America strategy into five types of diplomacy: support, deference, constraint, criticism, and defiance⁶⁵. The diplomacy of support will be the choice of Tokyo in the areas where Japanese and American national

⁶³ See Kiku Fukuda, 'Tatakawanai PKO to jietai' (PKO: An Innovative Notion of Non-use of Force). *Shin Boei Ronshu (The Journal of National Defence)*, 22.1 (July 1994), especially pp.95-96.

⁶⁴ The point is made by a practitioner of diplomacy as well as a group of academicians on Canada-US-Japan relations. See Ukeru Magosaki, *Kanada no kyokun (The Lessons Learned from Canada)* (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1992); idem 'Taibei senryaku wa kanada ni manabe' (Learn Japan's America Strategy from Canada), *Chuokoron* (December 1992), pp.88-99; and Mitsuru Kurosawa and John Kirton, eds., *Taiheiyo kokka no toraianguru: gendai no nichibeika kankei (The Triangle of Pacific States: Contemporary United States, Canada and Japan Relations)* (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1995).

⁶⁵ See James Earys, 'Canada and the United States', in Ann Trotter, ed., *Canada, New Zealand, and the United States* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1987), especially pp.149-154.

interests converge, as in most bilateral and multilateral issues. Japan can defer to the US on some issues which it may find largely congruent with its national interests, but not inclined to embrace with enthusiasm mainly due to Japan's domestic opposition. The diplomacy of constraint could be exercised towards high-handed American unilateralism that can cause strains in bilateral as well as multilateral relations, but it should usually take the form of moves behind closed doors. A similar tactic is the diplomacy of criticism against the US in public. This may be the most successful in cases where American society or government is divided over an issue, and has attentive ears to Japan's position, or where Japan can find like-minded allies in the multilateral forums to cause a change in Washington's stance. The last resort is the diplomacy of defiance. Extreme differences in each state's national interest may create this situation, but it must always be exercised with the utmost caution⁶⁶.

There is a pessimistic scenario that many Japanese objectives and those of the US may be on 'collision course' in the post-Cold War world when both nations do not face the common threat of communism or the USSR⁶⁷. It is, therefore, likely that Japan will increasingly depend upon the diplomacy of constraint or even criticism in facing US national objectives different from Japan's own objectives. Japan's pro-Iran ODA policy is an example involving different policies. Unlike the US, Japan has continued with its ODA for Teheran, based on the belief that international isolation of Iran does not serve the interests of the international community⁶⁸. The continued ties with Iran were not necessarily deleterious for American global strategy, as shown by Japan's access to vital information on the Iranian stance during the Gulf War in 1991⁶⁹. In other words, Japan can and should play the diplomatic function unavailable for the US executive branch thanks to domestic opposition and/or its historical misfortunes. Tokyo's relations with Havana, for one, falls into this category of diplomacy of constraint towards Washington.

The China-US-Japan triangular relationship is another area of crucial importance, with a possible Japanese policy of constraint on American unilateralism. Any rupture in Sino-American relations is the last thing Japan wants for the smooth triangular connection. American unilateral moves to 'contain' China carries 'a real risk of self-fulfilling prophecy and the emergence of a non-cooperative, assertive, unpredictable even belligerent China'⁷⁰. Beijing may get suspicious that the US is 'intent on destroying China' with a 'pre-emptive encirclement of the United States and like-

⁶⁶ For Japan to play a 'Russian card' or a 'China card' is considered an extreme case of defiant diplomacy. One must be very wary of this tactic since it might mean the demise of the Japan-US alliance relationship. Selling or transferring crucially important military high technology to an American adversary is against the spirit of US-Japan Security Treaty. For this type of policy of defiance, see Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan that can Say No: Why Japan Will be First Among Equals* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1991), especially pp.78, 115.

⁶⁷ See Strokes, 'Divergent Paths: US-Japan Relations Towards the Twenty-First Century'. Also Bryce Harland, *Collision Course: America and East Asia in the Past and in the Future* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996) makes the same point on US-China relations.

⁶⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 7 August 1996, p.1.

⁶⁹ The de facto military alliance between Baghdad and Teheran was the nightmarish scenario for US strategists during the Gulf War in 1991, but Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser, learned through vital Japanese intelligence in Teheran that this was not forthcoming. See Teshima, *1991 nen nihon no haiboku*, especially pp.262-266.

⁷⁰ Terence O'Brien, 'New Zealand in Today's World', a paper delivered to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Masterton Branch, 31 July, 1996, p.8.

mindful countries'⁷¹. Japan should do its utmost by any peaceful means to soften the troublesome relations between Washington and Beijing. It should caution Washington not to employ 'containment' policy by abandoning 'constructive engagement' policy while prodding Beijing not to use offensive military force⁷². In the worst case, however, the spirit and obligations of the US-Japan Security Treaty should be observed by both Americans and Japanese.

There is no panacea for US-Japan economic disputes. Undoubtedly, the greater opening of Japanese markets along with bold deregulation of its economic and administrative structure is the option that Japan should take. More active publicity and propaganda efforts from Japan directed at the American people are also necessary⁷³. One lesson to be learned from the US-Canada economic conflicts is the resultant creation of a rule-based dispute settlement mechanism in the form of the Free Trade Agreement (and later, NAFTA). A US-Japan free trade agreement with a rule-based dispute settlement mechanism may be a good option to 'depoliticise' unnecessary wrangles⁷⁴. The agreement should not be an exclusive one, but should supplement, not supplant, the existing free trade schemes in WTO and/or APEC. However, imposition of numerical targets, as have been offered by the Americans in the past, does not work in liberal economies where market forces rule, because, as Gary Saxonhouse points out wryly, 'nations do not command economies'⁷⁵. Washington and Tokyo can agree to a target trade surplus reduction for Japan, but their abilities to accomplish the 'target' are severely constrained by aggregate economic performance based on decentralised decision-making among countless microeconomic actors. Moreover, even President Clinton and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt admitted that the US is responsible for 80% of its overall trade imbalance with Japan⁷⁶. On the contrary, a free trade environment between the world's biggest and second biggest economic powers will, at least, create a level playing field between the two, and lessen the chances of 'sideswiping' other lesser economies in bilateral conflicts.

⁷¹ See Masashi Nishimara, 'Japan's Receptivity to Conditional Engagement', in James Shinn, ed., *Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p.181.

⁷² James Shinn and others suggest the ten principles of conditional engagement: no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, freedom of navigation, moderation in military force buildup, transparency of military forces, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, market access for trade and investment, cooperative solutions for transnational problems, and respect for basic human rights (in order of importance). Although the ten principles of conditional engagement do contain vital security interests for Japan, like non-use of military force and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, the US should be wary that the principles may be misperceived by Beijing as a stalking-horse of de facto 'containment policy'. In this respect, the present 'constructive engagement' policy of the Clinton regime has a better connotation, and is more reassuring for Beijing. Besides, how to put them into practice and to successfully engage China in a desirable way is another matter. See Shinn, ed., *Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China*.

⁷³ Some simple statistical facts seem not to be conveyed properly to the American masses. For instance, do many American farmers know that Japan is their number one customer, consuming 20% of their agricultural products? The answer looks like negative. See Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the post-Cold War World*, pp.197-198.

⁷⁴ See Tung, *Time for Plan C*.

⁷⁵ Gary Saxonhouse, 'Cyclical and Macrostructural Issues in U.S.-Japan Economic Relations', in Okimoto, ed., *Japan's Economy*, pp.144-145.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Ochiai, *Nichibei keizai masatu*, p.150.

If political difficulties prevent the two nations from developing free and fair trade, both can utilise the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO to the fullest extent for the solution of bilateral commercial irritants. Here, importance lies in playing a 'good loser' in observing the final judgements provided by the WTO jurisdiction. Japan's acceptance of WTO's judgement on discriminatory lower taxes on *shochu* (distilled spirits), if indeed it is found guilty, will be one example of being a 'good loser'⁷⁷.

What is needed in the all-important US-Japanese relationship is the establishment of the 'diplomatic culture'. Diplomatic culture refers to such factors as common language, exchange of information, the professional diplomatic ethic, ease of access, unofficial understandings and institutions for consultation and joint policy-making, that 'help to mute conflict and prevent disagreements and irritations from reaching crisis or confrontational proportions'⁷⁸.

Once considered to be unique to Ottawa-Washington relations, the concept is appropriate for Tokyo-Washington relations except for the factor of language. Not only the public, but the private sector as well should be fully engaged in the exchange of information buttressed by ease of access between the two societies so that egregious misunderstandings and misperceptions can be erased. Misunderstandings, such as that Japan's agricultural market is totally closed, are still prevalent, and can be utilised to inflate domestic suspicions of Japan in the US. The professional diplomatic ethic emphasises the importance of 'working through established channels, without wide publicity'; it cautions against the frequent use of the diplomacies of criticism and defiance, preferring behind-the-scenes bargaining. Unofficial understandings, or unwritten norms, if developed, can 'serve as points of reference and bases for decisions'. Problem solving at the administrative level tends to be easier as a result. Lastly, the two countries will need informal as well as formal inter-governmental institutions to help build more low-key, depoliticised methods of reaching an agreement. Specifically, a dispute settlement panel needs to be built, or more active use of the present institutions like the forums for Japan-US consultations on security is indispensable.

In short, Canadianisation of US-Japan relations should reduce the overt conflict between the two, and create more room for manoeuvre for the lesser power. This Canadianisation process should include 'intervulnerability'⁷⁹. It is a highly inter-dependent relationship bound by mutual self-damage; forceful one-sided moves will inevitably damage the initiator. The outcome of an 'intervulnerable relationship' should be self-restraint and compatibility of American and Japanese interests that will contribute to the overall stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Creation of a 'diplomatic culture' will help build this 'intervulnerability' across the Pacific, which, in turn, will sustain Japan in its diplomatic statecraft in bilateral and multilateral forums for years to come.

⁷⁷ See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 12 July 1996, pp.1, 7; and editorial, 13 July 1996, p.3.

⁷⁸ See K.J.Holsti, 'Canada and the United States' in Stephen Spiegel and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *Conflict in World Politics* (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1971), pp.390-393.

⁷⁹ For the concept, see Charles Doran, *Forgotten Partnership: US-Canada Relations Today* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

RUSSIA AND SECURITY IN ASIA PACIFIC

IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

By Rouben Azizian

Here are some thoughts on the perceptions in Russia on the international relations in the Asia Pacific region.

Firstly, we have to ask ourselves the question whether we have really entered a post cold war period. There are some indications, including the situation in the Asia Pacific, that we may be entering a new stage of tension reminiscent of the cold war period. This particularly refers to the growing concerns in the region about China's future policies here. A number of analysts are openly suggesting that we are witnessing a re-emergence of cold war in the Asia Pacific, with the Soviet Union being replaced by China in a confrontation with the United States. The Soviet-American détente and partnership has recently soured as well, and a number of politicians and analysts in Russia treat the expansion of NATO as a renewal of a cold war style confrontation between Moscow and the West.

It may therefore be safer perhaps to refer to the current period as a post-Soviet period in international relations and in the Asia-Pacific in particular. Nominally, at least, it is undeniable that the Soviet Union has disappeared and with it a whole system of international relations. The attempts by some Russian Nationalists to reanimate the USSR and to return to the days of Soviet foreign policy cannot be taken seriously. However, in terms of the substance of Russia's policy in Asia Pacific it is not quite clear whether Russia's current policy in the region is a complete change from the Soviet policy in the region. It is very important to understand how much of the Soviet policy in the region was ideologically motivated and how much was based on pure strategic calculation and pragmatism.

It seems that in real terms the Soviet foreign policy in the Asia Pacific was more geopolitically oriented than many believe. Of course the Soviet Union was keen to impose its ideological model on the Asia Pacific countries; it had in the region its ideological allies (such as Vietnam and North Korea) but as we know the real special partner in the region was capitalist India. The understanding of this situation helps to explain the fact that in spite of the end of the Cold War some of Moscow's preferences in the region, and the antagonisms, have remained unchanged. Russia is still unable to overcome difficulties with Japan and Russia continues to successfully foster relations with India.

It is therefore justifiable to point to a strong continuity in Russia's foreign policy in the Asia Pacific. Russia's foreign policy continues to be Eurocentric. Russia still has serious difficulties of a cultural and civilizational nature impeding its integration with the region. Moscow's economic reform is very dependent on Western support and particularly on the assistance of the Western dominated financial institutions. Russian foreign policy in the Asia Pacific continues to refer to large scale projects and security systems which do not correspond to Russia's current political and economic role in the region.

At the same time one cannot ignore certain new elements in Russia's policy in the region. With the loss of the republics the Asian part of the Russian territory has increased. Russia has also become more dependent on the mineral resources in Siberia and the Far East. There are no ideological constraints for Russia to develop cooperation in the region. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia pays much more attention to the economic security in the region whereas in the past Moscow was obsessed for understandable reasons with military aspects of security.

Russia seems to be more attracted by the economic growth in the region and is hoping to join the promising integration in the region. In view of recent difficulties with the West, particularly on the NATO issue, Russia is intensifying its relations on the Eastern front. Domestically, nationalists in Russia are becoming more loud in demanding a more balanced foreign policy and more focus on Asia.

This points to some similarities between Russia and New Zealand in developing relations in the Asia Pacific. Both countries are on the edges of the region. Both have been traditionally Eurocentric. Moscow and Wellington are still having difficulties in cultural adjustment to the region. Anti-Asian feelings in New Zealand are matched by anti-Chinese sentiments in the Russian Far East. Both countries are still not sure about their strategic policies and partners in the region.

The main security threats to Russia are perceived as the following:

1. The most serious threat emanates from political instability in Russia. Apart from factors in the Russian populated areas as well. The regions are frustrated by the reluctance of the Centre to delegate them more powers. The economic situation brings ethnic challenges in Russia, including its Eastern part, and there are seriously destabilizing events, which in the Far East are almost catastrophic. Strikes in the region have been going on for the last few months. Ideologically some of the regions lean to the communist forces and therefore find themselves in confrontation with anti-Communist Centre.
2. The much desired in the West decline in Russia's defence capabilities has led to new problems. The lack of funds and decline in discipline have made the Russian army a very weak and unpredictable force. Russian forces in Asia are in even worse shape than their European counterparts. Once the largest of the four Soviet fleets – and the one with the largest operating area – the Russian Pacific Fleet has seen hard times. Obsolescence of many of its warships and mismanagement are common there. The soldiers suffer from malnutrition and abuse by the seniors. The disgruntled commanders in the Far East are looking for support from local politicians including the communists. This creates a challenge and a threat to Moscow in case the political opposition to the regime is supported by the region's military.
3. Russia and Japan haven't been able to overcome their differences on the disputed islands. It is very unlikely that a solution may be found to the problem in near future. Domestic situation in Russia precludes the return of the islands to Japan. It seems that Tokyo has to be more sensitive to Moscow's internal difficulties. This may be helped by the fact that Japan is likely to be entangled in a territorial dispute with China.

4. Although on the surface Russian/Chinese relations are quite positive the long term picture can be different. Beijing is Moscow's largest buyer of arms but there are growing concerns in Russia about arming a potential future enemy. Many Russian analysts share the concerns in the West about China's possible domination in the region. Moscow is mindful of China's territorial ambitions towards the Russian Far East.
5. Russia is concerned about the situation on the Korean Peninsula in view of its geographic proximity. Any escalation of the Korean conflict will seriously affect Russia. This prompts Moscow to be more active on the Korean problem. However, Russians feel that they are being deliberately sidelined by the West. Having severed its relations with North Korea Russia has also lost its influence in this region. Attempts are being made now to correct this situation without of course reanimating the ideological closeness with North Korea.
6. Russia regards the regional conflicts as a potentially destabilizing force. Of particular worry is the conflict in Central Asia which according to Moscow may seriously enhance the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism. Recent events in Afghanistan have strengthen this worries.
7. Russia has failed to boost considerably its trade and economic relations in the Asia Pacific region. The region accounts for only twenty percent of Russia's total foreign trade. There are serious concerns in Russia that it may not be able to catch up with the economic integration in the region.
8. Russia faces a serious demographic challenge in the Russian Far East. The population of the region is only eight million whereas the number of foreigners in the region has reached disturbing proportions. According to some calculations the number of Chinese in the region has reached around two million.

At the same time Russia itself remains a security threat to the region. The main sources of this danger are domestic instability in Russia, growth of nationalism as well as Russia's arms supplies to the region. Although Moscow claims that its arm sales are not destabilizing the situation in the region. Russia's acute economic problems dictating a need for larger exports may question this pledge.

In conclusion it should be said that the best way of addressing the problems posed by Russia in the region would be to engage Moscow in the economic integration in the region. Any attempt to isolate Russia in the Asia Pacific will backfire. Being already frustrated by the NATO expansion Russia would treat such an approach as hostile and could take a more aggressive stand itself.

